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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKEY’S SOFT POWER STRATEGY: 
THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
Sakin, Ubeydullah 
MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin 
January 2017, 79 pages 
 
As one of the most comprehensive academic subjects, power studies involve 
various disciplines from philosophy to industrial management, political 
sciences, and international relations. In this work, as my main power concept, 
I adopt soft power, which is a matter of debate among international relations 
scholars. I focus on Turkey’s activism to generate soft power in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Evaluating the substantial transformation in Turkey’s foreign 
policy during the last decade, I argue that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a focus 
for Turkey’s foreign policy. Finally, I consider the obstacles to Turkish foreign 
policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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ÖZ 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN YUMUŞAK GÜÇ STRATEJİSİ: 
BOSNA HERSEK ÖRNEĞİ 
 
Sakin, Ubeydullah 
MA, Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hüseyin Alptekin 
Ocak 2017, 79 Sayfa 
 
En genişakademik konulardan biri olan güç çalışmaları, felsefeden endüstriyel 
işletmeye, siyasal bilimlere ve uluslararası ilişkilere kadar farklı alanları 
kapsamaktadır. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası ilişkiler dalında sosyal bilimciler 
arasında sıklıkla tartışma konusu olan yumuşak güç teorisi, temel güç teorisi 
olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin Bosna Hersek’te yumuşak güç 
elde etme çabalarına odaklanmaktadır. Türkiye’nin dış politikasının geçtiğimiz 
on yıl içerisinde geçirdiği değişim değerlendirilerek, bu bağlamda Bosna-
Hersek’in Türkiye için ayrıcalıklı bir ortak olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Bununla 
beraber çalışma içerisinde, Yeni Osmanlıcılık kavramının farklı tanımları 
karşılaştırılmakta ve bu kavramın dış politikaya yansımaları ele alınmaktadır. 
Son olarak, Türkiye’nin Bosna-Hersek’e dönük dış politika geliştirme ve 
uygulama çabalarına engel olan ve olabilecek hususlar tartışılmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yumuşak güç, Türkiye, Bosna Hersek, Yeni Osmanlıcılık 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The word “power” derives from the Latin word of posse, meaning “be able” 
(Merriam-Webster, n.d.). In the common dictionary definition with which I 
commence my exploration, “power is the ability to control people or things.” 
(Merriam-Webster, n.d.; Thesaurus, n.d.) Because “power” is the essential 
component of this study, I would like to continue with some arguments on 
what power refers to in politics. 
 
Traditionally, power has been perceived as the means to act with such 
sovereignty that is free from any restriction while being able to administer 
another’s actions regardless of that person’s choices. And being subjected to 
such administration is called powerlessness. This view is partially rooted in 
Robert A. Dahl’s studies. As one of the initiators of power studies, Dahl (1957) 
says power is A’s ability to get B to do something B would not do otherwise. 
Basically, having power is the possession of the ability to force individuals to 
act against their own will. Later academics have also agreed with this definition 
but introduced alternative perspectives as well.  
 
Nye (2011), on whose theory I build my thesis, focuses on a particular form 
of power that he calls soft power. This is, in a nutshell, getting another actor 
to comply without directly using force.  
 
Since its foundation in 1923 the Republic of Turkey based its reforms on 
Western social and political culture. When Mustafa Kemal consolidated his 
position as the founding leader of the country, the efforts intensified and an 
official process of self-Europeanization began. On the political sphere, the new 
republic adopted strong nationalism and defensive real-politik paradigms. And 
on social sphere, laws regulating alphabet, dress code, music, sanctuaries 
changed Turkish society. On the foreign policy sphere, extensive reforms 
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intentionally detracted Turkey from its predecessor Ottoman Empire’s regions 
of interest. Turkey in its initial decades seemed to be relatively uninterested 
with regard to the Middle-East and the Balkans.  
 
By the late 2000s, Turkish government launched a systematic programme, 
which I will call” Soft Power Strategy,” to regain influence on these regions. 
Its programme simply included “a new interpretation of history” as the main 
paradigm ofstate institutions to disseminate and support the new 
interpretation. The programme also enabled civic missions of various causes 
to spontaneously join the efforts to increase Turkish presence in the Middle-
East and the Balkans. Consequently, Turkey’s Soft Power drew attention and 
scholars like Vracic (2014), Arin (2015)viewed Turkey to be neo-Ottomanist, 
while other scholars like Taspinar (2008), Somun (2011) defended that Turkish 
policy was merely pragmatic.  
 
One of Turkey’s primary targets for its new foreign policy has been Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). Bosnia, since it became independent by the early 1992, 
has been a permanent focus of interest for Turkish state. Turkey was a 
determined supporter of Bosniaks during the Yugoslavian wars and has been 
involved in every stage of the post-war development process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. However, after Turkey began implementing its soft power 
strategy, the relations condensed into a multi-dimensional form. Thus, 
Turkish-Bosnian relations are likely to manifest trajectory of Turkish foreign 
policies from West-oriented defensive stance to the Middle-East and the 
Balkans-oriented offensive stance. This thesis will follow Turkey’s foreign 
policy practices and focus on its increased activism in the last decade by 
studying its foreign policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
1.1. Problem Formulation 
I wish to answer the following question within the problem area based on the 
introduction above: 
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How does Turkey use its soft power in its relations with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and what challenges it confronts? 
 
Sub-question: 
 
 How has Turkey’s foreign policy fluctuated from indifferent to assertive 
politics? 
 How has Turkey’s soft power strategy been perceived and challenged 
by different scholars and regional actors? 
 How has Turkey applied its soft power strategy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina? 
 
In this thesis, I will study Turkey’s foreign policy within the framework of Soft 
Power. I will add various other perspectives that are the main paradigm of 
power studies. I will be evaluating Turkey’s soft power strategy and the agents 
that enable the application of this strategy. Later, I will take Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as my case study. I will seek to understand how Turkey focuses 
on Bosnia with soft power politics.  
 
This thesis, along with focusing on Turkish activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
also studies main theories in power studies and political reactions to Turkey’s 
soft power strategy. While balance of power and relational power theories 
constitute the basis for the theoretical narratives, neo-Ottomanism constitutes 
the issue that critics mainly voice. I will convey my analysis of neo-Ottomanism 
that draws attention to Turkey’s activism in the Middle-East and the Balkans. 
I will compare two prominent arguments that Turkey is planning to revive the 
Ottoman Empire on one side and Turkey is simply pursuing pragmatic foreign 
policy on the other. Later, I will discuss about obstacles that Turkey faces while 
trying to carry its strategy to success. The issue of non-Muslim, Ottoman image 
amongst Bosnians, structural problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of 
Republika Srpska will be among the main issues to be discussed.  
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By studying these issues and answering the questions above, I will try to 
discover an extensive range of information about Turkey’s soft power strategy 
with its main actors, gains and challenges. Hence, I argue that Turkey bases 
its new foreign policy primarily on soft power and the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is one of the states that Turkey focuses for its new foreign policy. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
In this thesis, I employ qualitative analysis. I measure Turkey’s soft power 
initiative on Bosnia and Herzegovina using a number of qualitative sources 
such as political party publications, speeches of politicians, official annual 
reports of institutions and foundations, intergovernmental agreements and 
other related information mainly retrieved from the official websites of the 
related institutions. My secondary resources are news articles and reviews. 
These resources contain interviews with significant political actors and provide 
alternative perspectives. 
 
I employ latent content analysis to study reports, agreements, and party 
publications. And I employ process tracing to explain news and speeches. I 
have studied the activities of Turkish missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
understand Turkish soft power strategy in this country. For each mission I 
collected data with the following method. First, I studied the basic strategy 
and introduction of the mission. I benefited from the missions’ official web-
sites to obtain this information. Second, I studied the annual activity, project 
and financial reports of the missions. Again, I obtained the reports from the 
missions’ websites. And third, I studied the news articles about the missions 
published by Turkish and Bosnian media. The main limitation of this method 
was that some missions did not provide detailed reports and most of the news 
articles were published by Turkish journalist. Thus, I was not able to provide 
certain statistical analysis for some of the missions’ activities. 
 
I take Bosnia and Herzegovina as my case study due to its history, culture and 
Turkey’s current activism in this country. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a former 
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Ottoman territory and a predominantly Muslim populated country. It hosts 
numerous Turkish schools as well as tens of Turkish businesses, some of which 
make the biggest enterprises in the region. Turkish tourists rank as the 4th 
largest group of arrivals to Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Turkish Embassy in 
Sarajevo, 2015) And there is a very large Bosnian diaspora in Turkey. 
Moreover, Turkey was in close cooperation with Bosnia during the Yugoslavian 
war. 
 
Bosnia’s history with the Ottoman Empire and its shared culture with Turkey 
are unique assets for Turkey. These assets construct common values that are, 
as I will explain in the related chapter, at the center of the soft power concept. 
Additionally, Turkey has established a strong network of relations with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Hence, these reasons make Bosnia a favorable example to 
study Turkey’s soft power politics. 
 
1.3. Literature Review 
Due to his role as the founding scholar of soft power studies, in this thesis I 
have frequently referred to Joseph. S. Nye’s works. In 1990, Nye coined the 
term “soft power” in his book Bound to Lead: Changing Nature of American 
Power. He discusses that power is not only to have the right to make decisions, 
but also the ability to influence decision maker’s rationale. He describes three 
dimension; daily communication, strategic communication and building lasting 
relations, and three resources; a culture that is contextually attractive, political 
values that are sincere and consistent, and a foreign policy that is moral and 
legitimate (Nye, 2008). I will be employing the dimensions and resources of 
soft power to analyze Turkey’s strategy. 
 
Understanding Turkey’s soft power strategy required studying various 
dispersed resources. I benefited from former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu 
(2011) that discusses that Turkey’s Ottoman experience should be utilized as 
the center piece of its foreign policy because the experience is shared by 
various nations. I also benefited from Ibrahim Kalın (2011, 2012)whose 
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publications provided a more specific approach to Turkey’s foreign policy 
rationale. He discusses that the Turkish government is telling “a new Turkish 
story” that roots from Turkey’s cultural and historical experience and it 
focusses on the Balkans and the Middle East to inner parts of Central Asia.  
 
1.4. Organization of Thesis 
In the first chapter I present the problem area and problem formulation of this 
thesis. I provide information related to the method and literature of the thesis. 
I end this chapter with “limitations and justification” section where I express 
the logic of the thesis and certain issues that hampered my ability to obtain 
knowledge. 
 
The second chapter that presents the theoretical framework of this thesis 
consists of related theories and concepts in power studies, including soft 
power. In this chapter, I explain the types of powers and the transformation 
in the definition of power as has been exposed by various scholars like Robert 
A. Dahl, Steven Lukes, Peter Bacrach, Morton S. Bratz. I end this chapter with 
a broad explanation of soft power. 
 
In the third chapter I present Turkey’s soft power strategy. I begin with 
exploring Turkey’s traditional foreign policy paradigm with its reflections in 
international politics. I explore the paradigm shift in the beginning of the 21st 
century, mainly caused by the election of AK Party government. Later, I point 
to certain changes in global politics and how the changes effected Turkey. I 
highlight declarations of Turkish politicians and explain the new paradigm. I 
end this chapter by explaining Turkey’s newest foreign policy tools that 
together contribute to Turkey’s soft power strategy. 
 
The forth chapter explains Turkey’s application of its soft power strategy in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this chapter, I begin with studying history of 
relations between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I follow with focusing 
on the activism of Turkish public and civic missions in this country. I present 
7 
 
data relating to the economic and cultural investment brought by these 
missions. I end this chapter by explaining the variety of outcomes caused by 
public and civic missions. 
 
In the fifth chapter, I explain the obstacles and criticisms of Turkish soft power 
strategy. I begin this chapter by presenting some structural and fundamental 
challenges which Turkey faces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I focus on the 
sophisticated political system and fragmented society of this country. Later, I 
move to the issue of neo-Ottomanism as the global criticism directed to Turkey 
for its pro-active foreign policy in the last decade. I end this chapter by 
presenting counter-arguments. 
 
In the sixth and the last chapter I conclude my thesis with final remarks, 
limitations and future research suggestions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CONCEPT: 
POWER AND ITS SOFT FORM 
 
Studying history, one finds himself surrounded by unending struggles, 
relentless wars, crafty plots, domination strategies, responding domination 
strategies, theses that spark ideologies, and antitheses that produce 
confronting ideologies. The list continues tirelessly. Pieces of events 
materialize over and over again, with different names and in the hands of 
different actors. Looking into the Ottoman expansionism in the 15th and 16th 
centuries and British expansionism in the 19th century, we observe different 
masters, methods, geographies, and intentions; but the fact that both states 
aspired to enlarge their dominion remains undebated. The French Revolution, 
for instance, shattered absolute monarchies not only in France but throughout 
Europe. The revolution became a catalyst for universal human rights and 
transformed people into nations. But it did not end Napoleon's ambition to 
seek command of his neighbors and beyond.  
 
The United States and the Soviets were allies against Hitler’s Germany. They 
fought on the same side in the largest war in history and shared victory. 
However, following the end of war, their successful cooperation did not 
prevent the half-a-century-long global hegemonic struggle between them. In 
this chapter I will present some of the prominent studies on power. I will 
compare the most appreciated theories within the framework of politics and 
international relations. I will also convey my analysis on how these studies are 
reflected in the theory of Soft Power. 
 
Taking a step back from the examples above, I observe that states have always 
been struggling to align other states’ choices with their own. The context of 
these actions varies from the use of resources to the command of military 
assets and adoption of belief systems. Regardless of the practical reasons, the 
9 
 
ultimate target of states has been the security of power resources in any 
conflict that a state has been a part of (Mearsheimer, 2013). In other words, 
if we were to merge the outcomes of any struggle into one measurement unit 
and evaluate the pre-and post-struggle statuses of states by that 
measurement unit, the unit would have to be power. States may use, or claim 
to use, power for different purposes, but it is always power that states seek. 
 
2.1. Definition of Power 
The trouble with “power” as a unit of measurement is that the definition of 
power varies depending on the context it is used in. This constrains its 
employment as a standard and causes a variety of arguments on how and in 
what volumes power is applied. For this reason, I find it useful to explore how 
different scholars and actors have perceived the materialization of power. 
 
At the state level, military strength has been the ultimate measurement of 
power throughout history (Spykman, 2008). States have competed over the 
size and capabilities of their military. The strength a state projected had been 
measured in terms of its national power, the number of its troops, the 
mobilization skills of its armies, and the number of cities it conquered, namely, 
the fear its army instilled in other states. This idea directed thinkers to restrict 
the elements of national power to “population, territory, wealth, armies and 
navies” (Baldwin, 2013, p.274).  As I observe, these elements were chosen 
due to their significance in manifesting military power. The study of military 
competition between states and military alliances formed by states to 
dominate each other spawned the balance of power theory. Morgenthau 
(1985) explains the theory as; 
The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each, trying 
either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads to necessity to a 
configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim 
at preserving it. (p.237) 
 
Adopting the realist paradigm, the theory normatively approaches power as a 
single-dimension engagement between nations. The view in this thinking is 
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zero-sum. States continuously seek balance by either defending the status quo 
or attacking it. Any additional use or development of the elements of national 
power by A is considered to change the power balance to the detriment of B. 
 
By the late twentieth century, this theory was confronted by “relational power 
theory.” In contrast to the “national power approach,” which sees power as 
the domination of one state over another in a narrow single dimension 
perspective, relational power theory sees power as a relation between states. 
Power is perceived as state A’s capability, which relies on the elements of 
national power, to directly affect state B’s behavior in favor of state A. Behavior 
includes “attitudes, preferences, opinions, expectation, emotions, and/or 
predispositions to act” (Baldwin, 2013, p.274). Accepting power as a relational 
attribute adds additional practices to power, or incorporates power into 
additional areas of practice. The relation is not a uniplanar concept, it is a two-
way communication in various fields of interest. Considering this fact, relational 
power theory has introduced “dimensions of power”.  
 
2.2. Dimensions of Power 
As Baldwin (2013) explains, there are five dimensions to power. Because the 
shift from defining power in terms of elements to defining it in terms of 
dimensions is a milestone for the emergence of the soft power, I will briefly 
explain these five dimensions.  
 
 Scope is area of influence. It refers to “the sector” in which an 
actor is capable of changing others’ behavior. For example, the 
Chinese proposition regarding international law and human 
rights may not gain recognition, but its financial decisions can 
severely affect the global economy.  
 Domain is the significance or number of the states an actor can 
influence. Turkey may have managed to export its culture to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the EU exports its culture through 
a wide network of institutions to the whole Balkans.  
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 Weight is the chance of a state in achieving its desired level of 
influence over another state. It is basically the potential to 
successfully influence others. An American peace proposal for 
Syria may have a higher chance of acceptance by local Kurdish 
groups than a Saudi peace proposal.  
 
 Cost, as apparent, is the expenditure required to influence 
another state. Cost includes both states’ expenses. Russian 
sanctions on Turkey following the shooting down of the Russian 
jet fighter in November 2015 surely harmed the Turkish 
economy, but the incident involved costs to both states.  
 
 Means, which is divided into symbolic, economic, military, and 
diplomatic, is the way, the method, or the strategy by which a 
state influences others. Israel relies on economic and diplomatic 
means to influence the United States, but uses military means to 
influence Palestine.  
 
In the traditional theory of power, basically, a state with a powerful army is 
considered to have supremacy over any state that has a less powerful army. 
The relational theory of power, in contrast, while it acknowledges the essential 
role military plays in obtaining power, also points at the other dimensions of 
power. It is significant when one observes that the military is not always, and 
increasingly not at all, the most efficient way of dealing with issues. Military 
operations are very expensive and they no longer seem to be effective.  
 
In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, said "Five days 
or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than 
that, it won't be a World War III" (Esterbrook, 2002, para.5), while answering 
questions regarding the invasion of Iraq. After initiating the invasion in March 
2003, US troops continued fighting for more than eight years until they were 
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finally withdrawn in December 2011 by President Obama. The war in Iraq cost 
more than $815 billion (Belasco, 2014). Almost 8,000 US personnel were killed 
and more than 80,000 were injured. (Lutz, 2013) Today, some US troops are 
still in Iraq, training Iraqi forces. The US may re-initiate its ground operations 
in the region to fight al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH), a terrorist 
organization that partially emerged as a result of US military use in Iraq. 
(Baker, Cooper; Gordon, 2015) The war that was supposed to end in five 
months lasted a decade, and may continue for long years, costing more dollars 
and lives. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (2009, p.15), who 
seems to have acknowledged this scenario, admitted that “one of the most 
important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success 
is not sufficient to win [a war].” 
 
2.3. The Faces of Power 
Exploring the reasons behind why military alone is not sufficient to control 
other states, scholars have introduced three main paradigms. Enabled by 
relational power theory, the paradigms, also called “the three faces” of power, 
elaborate alternative ways in which states may use power. I think it is very 
important to have knowledge of these paradigms for a complete understanding 
of soft power. So, I would like to briefly summarize the faces of power.  
 
In the first face of power, studying the town of New Haven, Dahl (1970) 
asserts that it was only a small group of elite that ruled the town. Thanks to 
their wealth they controlled the decision-making process. Thus, those who 
were directly involved in the decision making process practiced power over 
others. In other words, power is the ability to convince others to behave in a 
way they would not otherwise, which makes the first face of power. For 
instance, during both opium wars, the Chinese struggled for approximately 
seven years to keep the British out of its ports. In 1860, heavily bombarded 
by the British navy, the Chinese legalized the opium trade and granted civil 
rights to Christians. The British obtained unlimited access to Chinese ports. In 
this case, the British used their capability to change China’s behavior. In 
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December, 1994, the UN Security Council voted on a draft resolution 
(S/1994/1358) to stop the Serbian government from shipping oil to Bosnian 
Serbs that used oil to finance the war against the Muslim city of Bihac. The 
members had spent days negotiating the resolution. Out of 15 members, 13 
voted in favor and China abstained. However, Russia, having the right to veto, 
voted no, and paralyzed the resolution. 
  
In the second face of power, Bachrach and Baratz in their Critiques of Dahl 
(1962) define power not only as the ability to convince others to behave 
against their own wishes, but also to keep certain issues out of the decision-
making process. Thus, vetoing the opposition party’s resolution about a 
softened terror law in parliament is surely power, but so is blocking the 
resolution from ever entering the parliament. Deprecatingapproval of Turkey’s 
the 17th chapterfor the EU membershipis a manifestation of power by the EU, 
but so is not opening the 20th chapter. Examples may vary. Germany may not 
have the preparations to host millions of refugees, but it has the capacity to 
prevent them ever entering Germany by dealing with Turkey. In other words, 
keeping issues off the agenda counts as power to the same extent as using 
power to change the outcome of the issues on agenda.  
 
In the third face of power, Lukes (2005) adds another concept to the previous 
two. He includes targeting a transformation of others’ preferences in the 
definition of power. Individuals make decision based on their preferences 
(interests). Any time there is an action to be taken, the decision-maker reviews 
options with regard to his/her interests. The same process applies to states as 
well. Thus, if a state is able to change others’ preferences, all decisions taken 
by other states will automatically be in countenance of that state. Without the 
need to directly encounter opponents, this concept focuses on an essential 
change in the opponent’s values and interests that are involved in the decision-
making process. Forcing states to adopt an open-market economy by invading 
them requires a lot of effort. Instead, exporting Western liberal values and 
internationalism costs less and creates much less reaction. These values 
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eventually lead to the open-market economy. Both changing and transforming 
the local economy are practices of power.  
 
2.4. Definition of Soft Power 
Having mentioned the fundamental studies on power, I would like to continue 
with the particular form of power that is the focus of this work, “Soft Power.” 
The term was coined by Joseph Nye. In Nye's words, his main definition for 
power is that "Power is the ability to affect the behavior of others to get the 
outcome you want" (Nye, 2008, p.94). Influenced by the scholars before him 
(Dahl, 1961; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974), Nye (2011) describes 
three ways to affect others. These ways could be considered as concepts or 
categories of power.  
 
Table 2.1. Nye’s Types of Power 
 
 
The first of these is coercion. Coercion is to threaten others to get the desired 
outcome. It is the traditional way of controlling others. For instance, in 630, 
when the Prophet Muhammad surrounded the City of Mecca with his ten-
thousand man army, he terrified the Meccans. Hours before the army 
approached Mecca, the city defenses fell, and Prophet Mohammed's army did 
not encounter any resistance (Presidency of Religious Affairs, n.d.). The 
Meccans handed the city to the Muslims on a plate, saving lives and expenses 
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for both sides. This is one of the finest examples of coercion. The capacity of 
the Muslim army was much greater than the City of Mecca, and the Meccans 
had only one alternative.  
 
To avoid a possible misunderstanding, I should state that even if there had 
been a battle between the Meccans and the Muslims, and Muslims captured 
the city after winning the battle, this would still have been an example of 
coercion. In this case, Muslims would have used not the threat of force but 
actual force to coerce the Meccans. Although these two cases differ in terms 
of their means, they are the same in terms of their ends, namely to force 
Meccans to behave in a way they would not have otherwise. 
 
The second is inducement. Rather than threatening, inducement suggests 
paying others to behave in the desired manner. Compared to coercion, 
inducement avoids physical battles and leaves less chance for reactionary 
movements. For instance, after the Second World War, the US initiated the 
well-known Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program, ERP) to aid war-torn 
states. The plan aimed to avoid Communist expansion, which could accelerate 
due to post-war poverty. The communists began losing popularity in the states 
that received funds from the Marshall Plan after it was signed in 1948 (U.S. 
Department of State, n.d.). Initially, the program was for the Western 
European states; however, the US offered to aid Czechoslovakia and Poland 
as well. The idea was to induce these states to become US allies. Both states 
found the US offer tempting. Although they were later coerced by Moscow to 
reject the aid, the US utilized the inducement strategy well, presented itself as 
an alternative to Moscow, and created strong states that successfully 
confronted the Soviets in the coming years. The US could have threatened to 
invade the Western States if they allied with the Soviets, but instead it chose 
to use funds to create its satellites. 
 
The third is attracting or co-opting. This is also what actually Nye points at as 
the soft power. In this category, others are not directly asked to behave, but 
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inspired to behave. In other words, others behave in the desired way 
voluntarily. They are not under fear, nor do they seek easy bounty, but they 
are self-motivated to conform. Following the AKP’s electoral success in the 
March, 2014 local elections, thousands gathered in the Gaza strip, cheering 
“Turkey’s democratic success.” The Gaza government spokesperson said the 
election results would encourage Turkey to extend further support to 
persecuted people (Haboosh, 2014). The 2014 election was a local election; it 
did not even elect the central government that designated state policies. Its 
outcome, surely, did not liberate Palestine, nor did it improve the Palestinians’ 
living conditions. However, Palestinians, not only the Palestinian government, 
voluntarily exhibited support for the AKP’s success. Turkey, particularly the 
AKP government, has attracted Palestinian support with its “guardian” image, 
without needing to threaten or induce Palestine. As Nye (2008) summarizes 
similar incidents, “If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not 
have to force you to do what you do not want.” (p.95) I will explore the reasons 
and methods for such attraction throughout this thesis.   
 
2.5. Dimensions of Soft Power 
Apart from the ways or channels of influence, Nye (2008) describes three 
dimensions to soft power: daily communication, strategic communication, and 
building lasting relations. Daily communication is to continuously inform the 
public about the decisions taken by the government. This, in a sense, is the 
explanation and justification of the everyday political agenda. It covers both 
domestic and foreign politics. States that understand the significance of this 
dimension establish international channels. Turkey’s TRT World, Britannia's 
BBC, Russia’s RT, France’s France 24, China’s CCTV provide daily 
communication. Social media is another instrument that serves this purpose. 
World leaders and government accounts find the chance to instantly comment 
on related events. Through healthy daily communication, states and leaders 
are bound to an information struggle to gain legitimacy. 
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Strategic communication is to foresee resistance to specific decisions, as well 
as significant projects and operations, and start informative campaigns to, 
again, explain and justify them. These campaigns focus on individual cases, 
launched before facing the case. Thus, public will digest favorable information, 
and not be misinformed. Strategic communication is a collective effort. Based 
on the context of the case, various institutions may participate. However, 
states have established special institutions focusing on strategic 
communication. Turkey’s Office of Public Diplomacy, the United States’ 
Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and China’s Office of 
Foreign Propaganda are some examples.  
 
Building lasting relations, the last dimension of soft power, is about raising 
allied individuals that hold powerful positions in their home countries. This 
dimension particularly serves to influence the preferences of the public. Long-
term projects, such as youth-exchanges, fellowships of all kinds, and 
commercial match-making efforts are some important examples. Exporting 
traditional and local popular culture, language, and history serves to build 
strong relations. Foreign individuals that are involved in these projects are 
expected to become natural sympathizers to the host country. On this 
dimension, Turkey’s Yunus Emre Institutes, Britain’s British Council, Germany’s 
Goethe Institute, France’s French Institute, Turkey’s Mevlana, the European 
Union’s Erasmus, and the United States’ Fulbright programs fall under this 
dimension. 
 
Before proceeding further, I would like to underline the issue of context that 
is very significant to have a complete understanding of Soft Power. “Because 
power is a relationship, by definition it implies some context” (Nye, 1990). 
Here, Nye is influenced by Sprout & Sprout’s (1965) statement that: 
Without some set of given undertakings (strategies, policies), actual or 
postulated, with reference to some frame of operational contingencies, 
actual or postulated, there can be no estimation of political [power] 
capabilities. (p.280) 
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In contrast to the capability of the first and second faces of power, which partly 
depend on context, soft power entirely depends on the context of power 
practice. More precisely, what A’s soft power is capable of depends on what A 
is going to use its power for. For instance, consider a U.S. army tank company 
that consists of 13 tanks. This tank company has the same anticipated 
destructive power in any battle. A tank’s firing range, operational range and 
maneuvering skills show little variation under different circumstances. On the 
other hand, President Obama’s use of liberalist discourse, as a soft power 
practice, to influence other states’ policies may give entirely different results 
depending on the context. Proposing same-sex marriage as a federal right 
would gain the US soft power in Europe. However, it would deteriorate existing 
U.S. soft power in Iran.  
 
In another case, Swiss banning the construction of minarets may generate soft 
power in Israel, but it diminishes Swiss soft power in Saudi Arabia. Thus, when 
studying a state’s soft power “one must ask the question [soft] power for 
what” (Nye, 2008). 
 
As Nye (2011) states, soft power operates on intangible sources such as 
culture, values, communication, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, 
and a successful economy, as well as a competent military. It also operates on 
sources in the fields of national intelligence services, information agencies, 
diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange programs, training programs, and 
assistance programs. In short, a country’s soft power depends on three major 
resources: a culture that is contextually attractive, political values that are 
sincere and consistent, and a foreign policy that is moral and legitimate (Nye, 
2008). 
 
The idea is to shape other states’ beliefs and preferences to gain more control 
over them without relying merely on active control. This works in the same 
way as parents working to transfer traditional sets of values and beliefs to their 
children so that once they mature they will independently refuse foreign 
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influence. Thus, in application, political leaders gain soft power by producing 
attractive ideas, setting the political agenda, and determining the framework 
of debate (Nye, 1990).  
 
For instance, during World War II, the allied states adopted freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, freedom from fear, and freedom from want as the four 
fundamental rights. These rights were announced to the world by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, the President of the United States, in a speech to the members of 
77th Congress (Roosevelt, 1941). Politicians, intellectuals, and common people 
found the idea of fundamental rights very attractive. Advocacy groups such as 
the National Association of Manufacturers voluntarily initiated campaigns to 
support the idea with posters and mottos such as “Defend America’s Freedom: 
It’s everybody’s job!” (NAM, 1942). 
 
Following the end of the war, efforts to define human rights and describe basic 
liberties began. Although its history is much older, the Commission on Human 
Rights was formed in 1946. Its members consisted of 18 different countries 
and Eleanor Roosevelt, first lady of the US and wife of President Roosevelt, 
chaired its work. The Human Rights Commission presented the final draft of 
the freedoms, named as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948. 
Later, after significant efforts on the part of the United States, the United 
Nations accepted human rights “as a common standard of achievements for 
all peoples and all nations” by two covenants, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights in 1966. These two covenants would form an important 
part of customary international law.  
 
The United States was the first to declare a possible set of internationally 
accepted rights, and again, it was the first to orchestrate the structure of these 
rights. And finally, the United States pushed human rights to the international 
agenda as a priority topic and assisted it to become a part of international law. 
By doing so, the American government generated a great amount of soft 
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power in the context of human rights. Now valued globally, these efforts 
enable self-initiated resistance to autocratic governments from citizens of 
various countries. And the United States is able to legitimize itself as “the 
protector” of human rights. 
  
Before going further, I would like to differentiate two interrelated terms, public 
diplomacy and soft power. Public diplomacy exports a state’s culture and 
values. It uses various materials and cultural institutions based in other states. 
Its outcome may produce soft power. But what if a state’s culture and values 
are not attractive. Trying to disseminate culture and values, in this case, may 
result in a loss of soft power, rather than further accumulation (Nye, 2008) 
Organizing huge commemoration ceremonies for the conquest of Istanbul may 
gain soft power in Baku, but it definitely does not attract Athens.  
 
Although soft power is relatively new as a concept, producing policies to gain 
public support is a very old practice. For instance, the Ottoman Empire would 
send its merchants ahead of its army to the lands it planned to invade. The 
merchants would tell the stories of how pleasant and secure it was to live 
under Ottoman protection (Yılmaz, 2011). Such information campaigns 
decreased the public resistance to the new Ottoman government. In another 
case, following the French revolution, The Council of State published materials 
such as pamphlets and newspapers in various European languages to affect 
the public and “export the revolution” (Yılmaz, 2011). The extensive volume 
of text produced and disseminated during this era laid the basis for French 
hegemony in this area, attracting other states, including the Modern Turkey to 
conform to the new French-led political order (Köçer & Egüz, 2013). 
 
2.6. Basis of Soft Power 
It is possible to trace the roots of the concept of soft power in traditional 
Marxist thought. For instance, the theory of false consciousness which Engels 
mentioned in a letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (Engels, 1968) refers to 
ideology dominating the consciousness of exploited groups and classes which 
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at the same time justifies and perpetuates their exploitation. False 
consciousness is the working class’ thinking that sees the success of capitalist 
goals as its own success. Engel says that the bourgeoisie use ideology, 
whether it is religion or nationalism, to convince the working class that all 
classes equitably benefit from the society’s resources. This sort of 
consciousness is named “false” due to the Marxist thinking that capitalist 
ideology is duplicitous, and that in fact it is only the bourgeoisie who really 
benefit from the resources. However, the dedication to ideology keeps the 
working class voluntarily consenting to capitalist exploitation.  
 
In a similar theory, the famous Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (2000) 
introduced the notion of “cultural hegemony.” Gramsci explains that the elite 
of the society imposes its culture on the lower strata of the society. Using 
various methods and information channels, the elite sets its values as norms. 
Eventually, subsequent generations become unaware of their original values. 
They voluntarily conform, and furthermore, defend the elite’s values. Thus, 
the elite, without having to struggle, consolidates its position of hegemony. 
 
While governments comfortably use tools such as education, regulations and 
popular culture to transform domestic public values, targeting another state’s 
values is a complex and fluxional process. Tools and methods for this purpose 
vary in accordance with the nature of the relations between the governments 
and publics of the states. Moreover, while domestic soft power practices are 
mainly in control of the government, international practices cannot be 
subjected to such tight control and they are exposed to intervention of the 
target state.  
 
In short, there are three faces of power that respectively consider power as 
the right to make decisions, the ability to intervene in the decision making 
process and the ability to influence decision makers’ rationale. The concept of 
soft power, heavily influence by the third face of power focuses on influencing 
the decision makers. It describes that an actor should operate on three 
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dimensions to influence its targets that are daily communication, strategic 
communication and building lasting relations. Moreover, an actor should have 
three resources to generate soft power that are a culture that is contextually 
attractive, political values that are sincere and consistent, and a foreign policy 
that is moral and legitimate. Based on these arguments, how an actor will 
apply its strategy on the field may vary according to the context of its relation 
with the target. In the following chapter, I will try to convey possible tools, 
methods and challenges in soft power policies in the example of Turkey’s 
efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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CHAPTER 3 
TURKEY’S SOFT POWER PROJECT 
 
In this chapter, that is also the core of my thesis, I will explain Turkey’s Soft 
Power strategy with its troubles and resources. I will analyze the historical 
background of Turkey’s foreign policy and its relation with the Balkans as well 
as the West, prior tothe implementation of Soft Power policies.  
 
As Nye (2008) describes, in addition to foreign policy that is moral and 
legitimate, a country’s soft power depends on two other resources that are 
“culture” which is contextually attractive and political values that are sincere 
and consistent. An attractive culture and consistent “political values” are, 
naturally, affected by the country's previous deeds, namely, on that country’s 
history. A state with a history that contradicts its political rhetoric would find 
it very hard to receive recognition to its agenda. Turkey, as a part of “Eastern 
culture block,” faces a major challenge. I find it necessary to briefly summarize 
how these challenges developed throughout its history. 
 
3.1. Historical Summary 
As a new and strong empire, which was able to protect people under its rule, 
the Ottomans gained a reputation for tolerating religious and other differences. 
Thus, when the Ottomans conquered Serbia in 1389, they seemed more as 
liberators than intruders. Under Ottoman rule, until the 1600s popular 
insurgencies were very rare (İnalcık, 2005). And these insurgencies did not 
spread until the early 1800s when nationalist movements reached these lands. 
However today, the majority of people living in the former Ottoman Europe 
perceive the entire Turkish history as a time of torture and enslavement 
(Vracic, 2014). 
 
Occasionally, the European view of the Ottoman Empire fluctuated as the 
relations with the Ottoman Empire changed status. In 1590, when the 
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Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its extraordinarily successful expansion in 
Europe, the Venetian Ambassador to Constantinople, Lorenzo Bernardo, 
noted: 
The Turks are low and vile people who neither know honor nor how to 
respect the word. Thus it is not surprising that they are unjust, because 
in the end violence, tyranny, and subordination are their natural 
condition. Their conduct towards us is malicious and it will always be 
utmost dangerous to believe in their goodwill. (Fassl, 2011, p.12)  
 
However, following the treaty of Passarowitz (1718) that passed the 
administration of Serbia from the Ottoman Empire to the Habsburg Empire, 
another Venetian writer, Francesco Gritti, tenuously praised an Ottoman Pasha 
with the following words:  
He is Ibrahim Pasha, from Caesarea, sixty-five years old, of delicate 
nature, and somewhat deteriorated for his licentious life. His figure is 
not very beautiful, but his appearance all the more sweet and 
courteous... Signing the treaty of Passarowitz, he honored his 
government and, in the first moments of glory and grace, became the 
liberator of the empire. (Fassl, 2011, p.14)  
 
3.2. Traditional Turkish Political Rationale 
Europe’s analysis of the Ottomans influenced later Turkish generations as well. 
Humiliated by the empire's downfall and devastated by the First World War, 
modern Turkey began transforming itself into a Western state. Becoming a 
true European state with all its modern values was thought to be the solution 
to all the problems Anatolia had been suffering from. Constructing a nation-
based identity, establishing a centralized government within precisely marked 
borders, as the Europeans did, and building a strong military were the 
challenges the Modern Turkey had to overcome. 
 
Only a decade after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the new regime began 
mass-importing European culture to Turkish cities. The regime copied politics, 
law, fashion, and even music from the West and forced them into society. In 
1926, Turkey adopted the Swiss Civil Code and Italian Criminal Code. In 1929, 
the German Law of Criminal Procedure was adopted and administrative law 
was modified in accordance with the French law (“Cumhuriyet,” 2016). 
25 
 
European codes inspired the founding leaders of modern Turkey in making 
many other laws and regulations. Some even intervened in citizens’ dressing 
habits. 
 
 In 1925, the head of state, Mustafa Kemal, stated in a speech in the city of 
Kastamonu:   
Dear friends, there is no need to study and promote Turkic dress. Our 
precious nation deserves civilized and international attire. That is what 
we shall establish. On our feet, shoes or ankle boots; on our legs, 
trousers, then waistcoats, shirts, ties and jackets; and in order to 
complete the outfit, a sheltering headgear. And this I want to express 
most clearly: the name of this headgear is hat. (Atatürk Araştırma 
Merkezi, n.d. p.32)  
 
Within three months a new law was passed in the parliament and wearing hats 
became compulsory in public.  
 
The government used radio to promote European music. In 1934, Turkish 
traditional music was banned on the radio. “It was observed that the streams 
included not only symphonic music but also examples of brass band music, 
solo singing performances and jazz songs as well. Turkish folk music was not 
broadcasted at all in Istanbul and Ankara radio shows until 1936” (Mutlu, 
2014). Along with these, the government introduced various new practices, 
including the radical alphabet reform and adoption of secularism, inspired by 
Western culture.  
 
During this period, transforming into a true “European” became the main and 
only objective of the Modern Turkish state. In the following decades, whenever 
the government tended to loosen its strict dedication to the unconditional 
objective of Westernization, the military intervened. In justifying the 
interventions, each time the military stated the importance of the reforms and 
goals defined by the founding leaders (Sakallioglu, 1997). 
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3.3. Reactions to Traditional Turkish Political Rationale 
Although undoubtedly sincere, these efforts failed to gain visible soft power in 
Europe. Taunting Turks as “the Other” did not change; rather it became 
ordinary in Western political culture. Turkey became one of the first states to 
be targeted in the political rhetoric of Europe. In 2002, when asked about 
Turkey’s EU candidacy, the former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing 
replied that Turkey was "a different culture, a different approach, a different 
way of life" (Black, 2002). In 2004, prior to PM Erdoğan’s visit to Brussels for 
EU integration talks, Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein stated that if Turkey 
was to enter Europe, "The relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain” 
(Traynor, 2004, para.11). In 2007, French President Sarkozy said in an 
interview that “I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe. Because 
Turkey is a part of Asia Minor" (“Sarkozy reiterates,” 2007, para.2). Surely, 
limiting the definition of Europe to geographical borders is not accurate while 
granting EU membership to states in distant locations such as Estonia and 
Finland. Indeed there is no law outlining the potential borders of the EU.  
 
The Brexit Referendum in late June 2016 was another example for Turkey’s 
failure to generate soft power.The entire pro-exit campaign, named Vote 
Leave and led by far rights politicians, focused on the destruction that Turkey 
would cause if it ever became a member of the EU. The issue of Turkey was 
Vote Leave’s first argument on its website where the British citizens were called 
to exit the EU (“What would,” 2016). The leaders of the movement wrote a 
letter to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of England, questioning the 
government’s policy towards Turkish accession to the EU. The letter demanded 
a guarantee that the government would be strict against Turkey’s accession 
to the EU (Stuart, Johnson, Gove, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the campaigners’ arguments emphasized the “violent” nature of 
Turks. In an official statement, Vote Leave said:  
This [the high birth rate in Turkey] will not only increase the strain on 
Britain’s public services, but it will also create a number of threats to 
UK security. Crime is far higher in Turkey than the UK. Gun ownership 
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is also more widespread. Because of the EU’s free movement laws, the 
government will not be able to exclude Turkish criminals from entering 
the UK. (Boffrey, Helm, 2016, para.5)  
 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime database, in 2012, 
the number of assault cases in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, England, 
Wales, and Scotland) was 688,4 per 100.000 people. This was almost two-
times higher than Turkey, which had 350.5 cases. In the same year, there had 
been 208,913 cases of theft in Turkey, whereas only in England and Wales 
1,474,291 cases of theft occurred (UNODC, 2016). The data showed apparent 
proof of the crime rates, and that the campaigners abused stereotypes about 
Turkey. And, as the exit decision indicates, they correctly read the public 
opinion. 
 
The systematic Westernization policy not only failed to gain European 
appreciation but also sacrificed potential ties with the historically allied and 
religiously related nations. Modern Turkey neglected establishing strong 
alliances with the emerging states in former Ottoman borders. It, in contrast 
to the late imperial policy, had little interest in integrating with these states. 
For the founding leader Mustafa Kemal, it was “foolish” ideologies such as pan-
Islamism and pan-Turkism that caused the empire’s humiliation (Carley, 1995). 
Atatürk had little interest in building strong relations with the Islamic world. 
Thus, from the 1920s onwards “one of the constitutive denials of the official 
Turkish republican ideology has been the proximities between Turkey and the 
Middle East” (Yörük, 2013, p.13). 
 
Europe’s unwillingness to embrace Turkey and Turkey’s nonchalance in 
seeking alternative allies left Turkey isolated. This situation was reflected in 
Turkey’s foreign affairs. Turkey from the beginning of its establishment began 
to perform “defensive and cautious realpolitik diplomacy” (Mitrovic, 2014). This 
posture was successful in holding Turkey off from conflicts, including the 
Second World War. However, it did not ameliorate Turkey’s solitude in the 
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Islamic world. In 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) 
came to power, the situation slowly started to change. 
 
3.4. Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy Rationale 
The new government created an offensive soft power policy to resurrect 
relations with Islamic states. The AK Party builds its strategy on the very 
elements its predecessors had denied for decades, namely culture and history. 
Culture and history gained significance as the new raw materials of Turkey’s 
soft power strategy. The current spokesperson for Turkish Presidency, Ibrahim 
Kalın, wrote in an article that “Turkey’s soft power potential, which extends 
from the Balkans and the Middle East to inner parts of Central Asia, emerges 
from the cultural and historical experience it has inherited.” (Kalın, 2011, p.10) 
 
The AK Party government considered Turkey’s international image poor and 
outdated, a distortion from the European Enlightenment years. So a new 
image was to be built on the past experience with the Islamic states. “A new 
Turkish story” was being told (Kalın, 2011). While telling the new story, the 
government did not deny its modern history. Instead, it simultaneously carried 
out a democratization process which was welcomed in the rest of the world, 
including the West. It indeed added its secular and democratic experience to 
culture and history to set an example as the ideal Muslim state (Öner, 2013). 
 
The new foreign policy did not aim to destroy Turkey’s current place in the 
West, nor did it clash with it. Turkey simply began a process of reconciliation 
with its own past. Thus, Turkey’s new image was declared to be a great 
civilization that is peace loving, seeks cooperation, shares culture with a vast 
geography and has a very deep understanding of the states in that geography. 
In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, President Erdoğan (2014) 
summarized Turkey’s new story as the follows: 
And today too, we view the -- all the states and peoples that used to 
make up the rest of the Ottoman -- what was then the Ottoman Empire, 
with peace, friendship, and solidarity. And we respect their territorial 
integrity. The reason why I make this point is to be able to say that 
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Turkey is a country which best knows, understands, and analyzes the 
geography that it's in, because we share a common history with every 
country and peoples in the region, including those areas of crises. 
(para.15) 
 
In his article “Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, values and mechanisms” 
(2011) the current Chief Policy Advisor to President Erdoğan Ibrahim Kalın 
explains that three reason are behind Turkey’s changing foreign policy: 
changing geostrategic environment, new-mindset, and new policy 
instruments.  
 
Turkey’s geostrategic environment has gained significant value after 9/11 
terror attacks to the United States. Turkey as a bridge between the Middle-
East and the West provided actors around its borders and beyond either by 
supporting military operations or undertaking mediating missions. Thus, its 
relations naturally changed in every direction. 
 
Globalization and Turkey’s internal politics strongly influenced Turkey’s foreign 
policy. State regulations became more liberal while the discourse of the state 
became more Islamized. Its sui generis features enlarged Turkey’s foreign 
policy horizon.  
 
Another transformation globalization cause, not only to Turkey, but to 
international politics in type of instruments used in foreign affairs. Direct 
confrontations between states turned to proxy struggles, and soft power 
gained importance. Instruments that proliferate a state’s values gained 
significance as strategic tools.  
 
Turkey, ignited by these reasons, added traditional Turkish-Islamic values to 
its worldview without giving up on democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law. (Kalın, 2011) 
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3.5. Tools of Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy 
Surely, changing the decades-old perception of Turkey requires more than 
tailoring an image at home. A state has to be able to explain itself through the 
right channels. It has to do more than promising and instead bring real proof 
to support its arguments. It should be able and available to assist its target 
states if demanded. And if its targets do not demand help, it should help 
regardless. However, A’s soft power works only when B finds its involvement 
legitimate.  
 
All this and more, which I will explain in the following attempts, requires an 
extensive amount of funds, as well as strong institutions and dedicated human 
resources. For this reason, Turkey began founding a series of institutions. The 
institutions work as operators in the field. They focus on different locations 
and target various populations. However, ultimately, their work generates soft 
power for the state.  
 
It is important to note that not all of these institutions are funded or operated 
by the state. Some institutions may be NGOs or private companies. Some may 
even be disfavored by the government. But they all contribute to Turkey’s soft 
power machinery. The institutions may be categorized as State to Public (StP) 
and Public to Public (PtP). StPs are official government institutions that may 
be dependent or semi-autonomous which primarily target another country’s 
society by a certain methodology within a framework of specific issues. PtPs 
are non-governmental and private sector organizations that target another 
country’s society by a varying methodology within a framework of commercial, 
cooperative, charitable and cultural issues. 
 
Turkey’s state to public institutions may be listed as the Prime Ministry 
Directorate General of Press and Information (DGPI), Prime Ministry Office of 
Public Diplomacy (OPD), Prime Ministry Turkish Coordination and Cooperation 
Agency (TIKA), Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related 
Communities (YTB),  Prime Ministry Presidency of Religious Affairs (DIB), 
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Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), 
Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (GOC), 
Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kızılay), Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation (TRT),  Turkish Airlines (THY), Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), and 
municipalities. 
 
Due to their multitude and scattered positioning, it is not possible to list all 
public to public missions. Some of the major institutions that target the sample 
of this paper, Bosnia and Herzegovina, are the Humanitarian Relief Foundation 
(İHH), Foundation for Development of Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BIGMEV), International University of Sarajevo (IUS), Istanbul Chamber of 
Commerce, and Islamic communities. In the following chapters, I will introduce 
these institutions and analyze their work based on their operations in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
 
3.6. Leadership and Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy  
A leader should have policy vision, communications and emotional IQ in order 
to generate soft power.  Policy vision is the ability to attract followers, 
communications is the ability to speak persuasive words to near and distant 
followers, and emotional IQ is the ability to manage relationships with 
charisma. (Nye, 2006) Importance of these skills may vary in accordance with 
the changes in available resources, target population, opponents’ conditions. 
In some situations, leaders may have to use some portion of hard power as a 
supplement to soft power. To understand how to carefully mix the two sorts 
of power, without harming generation of soft power, a leader should have 
Contextual Intelligence. (XXX) In other words, the leader should be able to act 
in accordance with the context of the situation he/she is in.  
 
Nye (2006) says “leadership and power are inextricably intertwined.” To 
materialize all sorts of potential into any category of power, there has to be a 
leadership. And the ability of the leadership is an essential determinant to 
volume of the power produced from available resources. Leadership and soft 
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power would make a title for a separate research. However, before moving to 
the Turkish soft power offensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would like to 
briefly analyze Turkey’s leader President Erdoğan’s role in Turkey’s soft power 
strategy.  
 
In my opinion, Davos meeting in 2009 where Erdoğan confronted former 
Israeli President Simon Peres on Palestine was a turning point for Erdogan to 
internationally manifest his skills. Palestine was a sensitive issue for Muslims 
around the world and, together with Erdogan’s communication skills, it drew 
abounding attention. After his speech in Davos, hundreds gathered in Gaza 
and around the world to manifest solidarity with Erdogan. (Anadolu Agency 
[AA], 2009) In the following years, the AK Party, under his leadership, 
continued to support politically suppressed Muslims around the world. These 
efforts returned more international recognition to Erdoğan, particularly in 
Muslim states. 
 
In 2011, while asking for financial aid, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek 
Tambavey, openly called Erdoğan “ağabey”, a title in Turkic culture that 
literally means “elder brother” (Milliyet, 2011).  In 2014, while being 
interviewed by a reporter, a Patanian Muslim community leader began praying 
for the well-being of Erdogan in tears, expressing his sorrow for the excessive 
criticism directed to Erdogan following the Gezi events (Asılsoy, 2015). Also 
following the Gezi events, in Gostivar, Macedonia, thousands of Erdogan 
supporters gathered to support him against the critics. The crowd cheered in 
the Turkish, Bosnian, Macedonian, Albanian and English languages that “You 
are not only the Prime Minister of Turkey but of the 1.5 billion [Muslims]” (AA, 
2013). Similarly, in a press conference before the Turkish presidential elections 
of 2014, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bakir Izzetbegovic said “Erdoğan 
is a very special person. He is not only the leader of Turkey, but of all Muslims, 
everyone looks up to him and wishes his success.” (AA, 2014, para.4) 
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As the examples indicate, for nearly a decade, Erdogan has become a celebrity 
in Muslim-dominated economically underdeveloped states. Governments and 
societies have both responded to his policies with respect and sympathy. 
Surely, Turkey’s significant efforts in producing soft power cannot be reduced 
to a single figure. However, Erdogan’s exceptional fame definitely contributed 
to the positive image of Turkey. 
  
More examples may be found in various incidents. However, undoubtedly, the 
hardest challenge to Erdoğan’s soft power was the attempted military coup on 
the night of July 15, 2016. The Turkish public was terrified by sonic booms 
and whirling helicopters. News told that tanks were ramming through civilians, 
and soldiers were firing at public buildings. Citizens watched media channels 
being assaulted live on television. In the middle of this chaos, Erdoğan made 
a brief video call to a news program. He declared the coup unlawful and said 
“I invite my citizens to the squares.” (“Cumhurbaşkanı,” 2016, para.1) Millions 
marched into the streets only minutes afterwards, and after long hours of 
clashes the coup was suppressed. Although Erdoğan’s call was only to the 
Turkish public, thousands attended the call abroad. 
 
People gathered in the biggest cities of Palestine, Somalia, Switzerland, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, France, Macedonia, Hungary, Canada, Qatar, and Brussels 
to support Turkey after the president’s call (“Dünya ayakta,” 2016). After the 
initial defeat of the uprising, the president thanked the public and asked them 
to stay in the streets until a second command. People held the squares for 
weeks. They worked during the day and protested during the night. Moreover, 
5 million people attended the Democracy and Martys’ Meeting that was 
organized under Erdogan’s leadership to protest the failed coup, making it the 
largest public gathering in Turkish history. 
 
Although Turkey’s agenda has been occupied by the crisis with Russia, Europe, 
and the US for the last couple of years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has always 
held a particular place for Erdoğan, due to Erdoğan’s pledge to the founder of 
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the current Bosnian state, Aliya Izzetbegovic, regarding the assistance to the 
country. On October 18, 2003, Erdogan visited Izzetbegovic in his home, a day 
before his death. Izzetbegovic told Erdogan, as reported, “Look after my 
Bosnia, protect her” (AA, 2010, para.4). Erdoğan has conveyed Izzetbegovic’s 
request various times in his speeches. In 2010, during the Srebrenica 
Memorial, Erdogan told a reporter that Izzetbegovic said to look after Bosnia 
and I told him that “we will never leave Bosnia alone.” (Akparti Avrupa, 2010) 
 
Whether influenced by Erdoğan’s dialogue with Izzetbegovic or not, Bosnian 
people have been determined supporters of Erdogan. Joined by the Turkish 
citizens living in Bosnia, the majority of the Bosnian public has keenly followed 
political developments in Turkey. Turkey and Erdoğan were regularly given 
space in the mainstream Bosnian media, as well as the social media. Analyzing 
Turkey’s history and activities in the country, this is not very surprising. 
 
During the Bosnian war, Bosnian Muslims –later named Bosniaks-, the majority 
of Bosnia, realized that Turkey was the only country they could ask for help 
(Coşkun, 2011). It seems that Turkey’s defender image remains unchanged. 
Although Europe and the United States also fund development programs in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks consider Turkey as the real trustworthy 
friend that will not wait until things become tragic to lend its hand. (Vracic, 
2014) And Erdogan, as the representative of the stronger and more generous 
Turkey, is an important factor in gaining Bosnia’s allegiance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TURKEY’S SOFT POWER OFFENSIVE IN 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
4.1. State Missions 
In the case of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus reverse-
Westernization worked as a soft-power generator. The more Turkey focused 
on its long-abandoned history, culture, and old allies, the more soft power it 
accumulated. And this process continues in an observably accelerating fashion 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Historically, Bosnia was Ottoman Empire’s most beloved eyalet in the central 
Balkans. Converting to Islam, raising statesmen and soldiers for the empire, 
Bosnia was definitely inalienable for Ottomans. However, four centuries after 
its conquest, the empire had to leave Bosnia to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
From the time of its withdrawal from Bosnia to the fall of Yugoslavia, the two 
nations could not find any concrete basis to establish strong ties (Vracic, 2014). 
Nevertheless, Turkey has been a keen supporter of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina since its foundation. 
 
The Turkish government recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on February 6, 
1992 as an independent state even before Bosnia held its independence 
referendum on February 29, 1992.  Turkey was the first to realize the potential 
war between Serbs and Bosniaks in the country. Within a few weeks, Turkey 
held a meeting with the Organization of Islamic Conference (now, Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation) members on 17-18 June, 1992 in Istanbul that urged 
the UN to intervene in Bosnia (OIC. Res. 1/5-Ex, 1992). 
  
In August 1992, realizing the Western disinterest for intervening in Bosnia, 
Turkey proposed an action plan to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
that consisted of political and military scenarios (“Türkiye’nin,”1992). At the 
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time, Turkey was under heavy terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist PKK 
that occupied its domestic and foreign agenda. Nevertheless, Turkey continued 
its efforts to draw attention to the conflicts in Bosnia. In November, 1992, the 
Foreign Ministry organized a Balkan Conference that was attended by Bulgaria, 
Slovenia Macedonia, Croatia, Austria, Italy, Romania, and Hungary. The main 
concern of the conference was the possibility of war spreading to other parts 
of the Balkans. The message the Balkan Conference sent to the UNSC was 
simple; “send troops into the region” (“Bölgeye asker,” 1992). 
 
Frustrated by the Western apathy in Bosnia, the Organization of Islamic 
Conference focused on lifting the arms embargo on Yugoslavia to legally arm 
the Bosniaks. Turkey supported the OIC resolution that demanded the UNSC 
to lift the embargo (OIC. Res. 7/21-P, 1993). Meanwhile, Turks took initiative 
in the following years and began secretly sending weapons to Bosnia, some of 
which were captured by European intelligence agencies (Coşkun, 2011; 
Hedges, 1996). On the other hand, the Turkish state attempted to broker 
peace in Yugoslavia between various parts a number of times. Turkey 
participated in almost all of the mediation attempts during the entire war either 
by organizing the meetings or advising the organizers (Coşkun, 2011). 
 
When the international community finally intervened in Bosnia, Turkey 
ambitiously participated. It was a part of the peacekeeping forces and 
operations since the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia. Turkish troops 
participated in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that was 
formed in 1992 and ended in December 1995 (UN, 1996). From July to 
December 1995, Turkish pilots flew 78 sorties over Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
part of the UN-led NATO mission, Operation Deliberate Force that pushed the 
Serbs to negotiate the Dayton peace agreement (global security, n.d.). 
 
Following Dayton, from December 1995 to December 1996, Turkey 
participated in Operation Joint Endeavour, also known as Implementation 
Force (IFOR) that was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 
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peace agreement (NATO, 1996). In the same year, the United States 
announced an aid program to rebuild war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
asked for donations. A report by the US General Accounting Office (1997) 
regarding the progress of the Dayton agreement stated that: 
In March 1996, the U.S. government announced the program and 
began soliciting international cash and in-kind donations for the 
program at a conference held in Turkey. Although 32 nations and 5 
international organizations attended, only Turkey and the United States 
made a specific pledge at that time, while 5 other nations pledged to 
provide unspecified material and technical assistance in Bosnia. (p.82) 
 
According to the report, Turkey donated 46.5 million dollars, a third of the 
amount donated by all Muslim states and NGOs. 
 
In the late 1996, IFOR transferred its mission to SFOR (Stabilization Force), 
again with Turkish participation until NATO ended this mission and the EU took 
over in 2005. From 2005 onwards, Turkey has continued to be a part of EUFOR 
(European Union Force) under Operation ALTHEA (EUFOR, 2015). As of 2011, 
Turkish troops are the second largest force in the mission (MFA, n.d.). 
 
From 2003 until it ended in 2012, Turkish police participated in EUPM (EU 
Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) Moreover, Turkey has been 
contributing to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina by training local police 
for nearly two decades (“Turkish police,” 2016). Today, Turkey is the strongest 
supporter of Bosnia’s membership to NATO. Croat member of the Bosnian 
Presidency, Dragan Čović, said in a press conference with President Erdoğan 
that “Without friends like you and your representation in NATO union we could 
not proceed in this [NATO membership process] matter” (Presidency, 2015, 
para.5). 
 
Simultaneously, Turkish officials produced strategies to reintegrate Bosnia into 
the region. From 2009 to 2012, Turkey tailored peace talks between Serbia 
and Bosnia with a series of meeting attended by the presidents, prime 
ministers, and ministers of foreign affairs of all three states. Particularly, the 
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Balkan Summit of 2010 was a “historic” example of mediation (Turbedar, 
2011). These meetings resulted in Bosnia opening an embassy in Belgrade, 
and Serbia condemning the Srebrenica Genocide, a major breakthrough in the 
post-war reconciliation period. 
 
Looking at the economic relations, although the Turkish President announced 
Turkish investment not to be at the desired volume, Turkish businesses are 
among the top traders in Bosnia. As of May 2016, Turkey is the 6th largest 
trade partner of Bosnia (BHAS, 2016). Moreover, the Turkish state has 
invested 85 Million Euros in Bosnian agriculture and plans to invest another 15 
Million Euros in this sector (Presidency, 2015). 
 
Today, Turkey’s soft power in Bosnia heavily relies on its state-to public-
missions. I find it very important to separately explain the institutions that 
carry out these missions. Meanwhile, I will be defining dimensions and 
resource-incentive efforts of the missions, based on the three soft power 
dimensions, that are; daily communication, strategic communication, and 
building lasting relations, and three soft power resources that are; a foreign 
policy which is moral and legitimate, a contextually attractive culture, and 
consistent political values as set by Nye (2008). I have explained these 
dimensions and resources in previous chapters. 
 
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency is one of the strongest 
representatives of its missions. Founded in 1992 to assist Turkic states in Asia 
in reviving their own culture after the fall of the Soviet Union, TIKA expanded 
its domain to global level by 2002 (TIKA, n.d.). Relatively, TIKA’s activity areas 
(means) have expanded over the years. Its activities include education, health, 
water and sanitation, administrative and civil infrastructure, production 
sectors, economic infrastructure and services, and other social infrastructure 
and services.  
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According to its latest available annual report in 2013, TIKA has spent 4.10% 
of its overall budget in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BİH). It established study 
centers, health centers, laboratories, water networks, and restored various 
buildings. It completed a major agricultural development project in the east of 
BiH. TIKA supported the re-development of prominent national products such 
as honey and handmade rugs. It also invested in the revival of national culture 
by restoring historical bridges and mosques. (TIKA, 2013)  
 
Some of these restoration projects are very strategic in regard to reviving the 
Turkic portion of Bosnian culture. The restoration of monumental buildings 
that were constructed by the Ottoman Empire such as the famous Mostar 
Bridge in the city of Mostar (1566),  Drina, or Mehmed Pasa Sokolovic bridge 
in the city of Visegrad (1577), Emperor’s Mosque in the city of Sarajevo (1457), 
Kursumlija Mosque in the city of Maglaj (1560), Bascarsija old town in the city 
of Sarajevo (1462), Mevlevi Tekke in the city of Sarajevo (1462), Ferhadija 
Mosque (1579) in the city of Banja Luka, Karadoz Beg Madrasa in the city of 
Mostar (1554) and many more are visible representation of the “glorious” 
Ottoman past of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
TIKA contributes to build lasting relations. Its work produces items that last 
years and bear influential historic significance for a broad domain. Mosques, 
madrasas, bridges, schools and health centers are visited by thousands of 
people each day, reminding people who built them. Some of its work has also 
increased the attractiveness of Turkish culture. A beautiful mosaic in a restored 
Ottoman Mosque, or a consolidation technique used in an Ottoman bridge may 
awaken interest among the locals, and perhaps, direct them to reevaluate the 
Turkish presence in the region. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a fixed target for one of world’s oldest and 
Turkey’s oldest humanitarian organization, Turkish Red Crescent. Originally 
founded in 1868, the organization aimed to aid wounded Ottoman soldiers 
during the empire’s military operations. With the declaration of the republic, 
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the organization took its modern format and today its operations are global. 
Since 2007, the organization has sent large volumes of beef to Bosnia as part 
of its eid al-adha project that covers 18 countries. Last year the aid was 100 
cattle in Bosnia. (Türk Kızılayı, 2015) The organization also sends green 
housing materials to distant villages. Within its primary operation purpose, 
providing post-disaster humanitarian relief, after the devastating floods that 
intensified around the city of Maglaj, Turkish Red Crescent sent 31 trucks and 
one military plane of aid materials that contained goods from blankets to 
furnitures. (Türk Kızılayı, 2014)  
 
Its biggest partner in this operation was another Turkish institution, the 
Turkish Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 
(AFAD). Since its foundation in 2009, AFAD has continued operations in Bosnia. 
It sent humanitarian aid along with three firefighting helicopters during the 
forest fires between 2010 and 2013. The organization also prepares Bosnian 
schools for potential disasters (AFAD, 2015). Along with organizing various 
study and focus groups, AFAD also trains Bosnian personnel and helps develop 
local rescue system in Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFAD, 2014). 
 
Both Kızılay and AFAD operate on the dimension of building lasting relations. 
Their work aims to establish friendships that are bound by strong feeling such 
as compassion and gratitude. These friendships, when consistently supported, 
may result in mutual trust and powerful allegiance. Moreover, their work 
contributes to increase consistent political values as a resource. Turkey’s claim 
to have good intentions and unconditional support for Bosnia finds 
representation in the generous aid of these missions. 
 
Perhaps the most important institution among the institutions that implement 
Turkey’s soft power offensive is the relatively young Yunus Emre Institute. 
Founded in 2007 and operational since 2009, the institute’s main aim is to tell 
a “new story.” Seref Ateş, the president of Yunus Emre Institute, declares the 
institution's mission as: 
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Turkey's cultural institution Yunus Emre Enstitüsü that protects major 
Anatolian civilizations and makes efforts to bring the cultural heritage 
of this region to various corners of the world, plays a significant role in 
making the ancient sound of Turkish language heard in the world as 
well as introducing our historical and cultural heritage (Yunus Emre 
Institute, n.d. para.2). 
 
The institution continuously organizes cultural events, funds projects that 
promote Turkish culture and teaches Turkish language to locals in each 
location. Through another language program, the institution certifies non-
Turkish citizens as eligible Turkish language teachers, and offers employment 
opportunities. Organizing symposiums, seminars and mini-courses on Turkish 
language are some of its other activities. Bosnians are fond visitors of the 
institute. As of the end of 2014, 3,118 Bosnian citizens had successfully 
completed a Turkish language course in the two institute branches in the cities 
of Sarajevo and Fojnica (Yunus Emre Institute, 2015). 
 
The Yunus Emre Institute also operates on building lasting relations. Its efforts 
directly target culture exportation and result in individuals that understand 
Turkey from the Turkish perspective. Its students study science, arts, and 
politics in the Turkish language, which presents alternatives to foreign 
perspectives. These people are also able to realize certain cultural details that 
may be lost in translation. In the long-term, they may voluntarily confront 
intentional or unintentional misrepresentation of Turkish culture and history. 
 
The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities is another 
significant government mission for Turkey’s soft power offensive. Founded in 
2010, the presidency seeks to establish professional relations and revive 
cultural ties with Turkish citizens living abroad as well as related minorities 
around the world. However, its most popular service is the scholarships it 
grants to the students from kinship and related communities from 153 
countries.  In 2015, more than 15 thousand students were granted 
scholarships to study in Turkey (YTB, 2016). Within its Balkan Scholarship 
Programme, Bosnian students are also brought to Turkey to receive education 
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in the most prestigious universities. In 2015, the presidency organized an art 
workshop in Turkey that was attended by 150 student from Bosnia and 8 other 
Balkan states. The students’ fees, transportation an accommodation were paid 
by the presidency. (YTB, 2015) 
 
As apparent from its name, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related 
Communities, operates on the dimension of building lasting relations. Through 
various cultural and scientific efforts, it aims to revive relations between Turkey 
and other nations. Its scholarship program raises generations that may have 
very good knowledge and experiences of Turkey. Moreover, its work enhances 
the attractiveness of Turkish culture and provides consistency for Turkey’s 
political rhetoric about Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Table 4.1. List of Turkey’s State Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Name Establishment Working Area 
Soft Power 
Dimension 
Presidency of 
Religious Affairs 
1935 
Education; 
Religion 
Build lasting 
relations; Strategic 
communication 
Turkish Red 
Crescent Society 
1947 
Humanitarian 
Relief 
Building lasting 
relations 
Turkish Radio and 
Television 
Corporation 
1964 Media Daily communication 
Turkish Coordination 
and Cooperation 
Agency 
1992 
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
Building lasting 
relations 
Disaster and 
Emergency 
Management 
Authority 
2009 
Humanitarian 
Relief 
Building lasting 
relations 
Turkish Airlines 1933 Transportation 
Building lasting 
relations; Daily 
communication 
Yunus Emre 
Institute 
2007 Education; Culture 
Building lasting 
relations 
Presidency for Turks 
Abroad and Related 
2010 
Education; 
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
Building lasting 
relations 
 
Turkey’s official religious regulation and fatwa authority, the Turkish 
Presidency of Religious Affairs is another institution that has developed strong 
ties with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its primary counterpart in Bosnia is the 
Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica) which is the largest Islamic 
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organization in the country. The Islamic Community is independent from the 
state and elects its own board of managers. Its president is given the title of 
Grand Mufti. The presidency has permanent Religious Affairs Consultants that 
carry out diplomatic missions in Bosnia and work with the local community. In 
2015, a cooperation protocol between the presidency and the community was 
signed. In his speech in the signing ceremony, President of Religious Affairs 
Mehmet Görmez stated that “Between Turkey and Bosnia, we do not only have 
signed protocols on documents but between hearts” (TRT, 2015, para.2). 
 
In accordance with the cooperation protocol, the presidency sent 23 hafizes 
to various cities in Bosnia during the last Ramadan. Each year there are 
numerous consultation meetings between the two parties. The presidency is a 
regular donor for Ramadan feasts and distributes Qurans to hundreds of 
Bosnian Muslims. It restored Travnik Madrasa which is one of the biggest 
Islamic schools in Bosnia. Moreover, 9 masjids and one library were restored 
in the Defense Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Presidency (Diyanet 
Foundation, 2015). 
 
The presidency of Religious Affairs has the broadest common cultural platform 
due to its Islamic identity and endeavors to build lasting relations and establish 
strategic communication. Its religious officers convey the Turkish 
interpretation of Islam while establishing strong professional ties with their 
Bosnian counterparts. Its president informs the Islamic Community in Bosnia 
about developments in Turkey. This prepares the local community for 
upcoming situations in Turkey. For instance, following the July 15 coup 
attempt, President Mehmet Görmez told the Reis-ul Ulema of Bosnia and 
Kosovo about the junta and their movement’s ill-intentions (“Diyanet İşleri,” 
2016). The presidency consolidates the resource of political values. Turkey’s 
Islamic identity proves its maturity through the presidency’s assistance in 
Bosnia.  
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Partially state owned, one of Turkey’s front-running corporations, Turkish 
Airlines, is a major contributor to the Bosnian air-transportation and tourism 
sector. With at least 14 flights each week, Turkish Airlines is one of the most 
frequent guests of the Sarajevo Airport. Its role in generating soft power is its 
costly sponsorships activities. Turkish Airlines is the official sponsor of Sarajevo 
FK, one of the biggest two football clubs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It funds 
the nation’s most prestigious international music and film festivals, such as the 
Sarajevo Film Festival and Sarajevo Jazz Festival. 
 
Turkish Airlines operates on building up the dimension of lasting relations and 
establishing daily communication. Its transportation services enable 
establishing and maintaining relations between the two nations, while its 
sponsorship programs increase Turkey’s daily visibility, in major football 
competitions and the most popular cultural events, attendees see Turkey's 
contribution. The company sets another example for Turkey’s pledged 
assistance to Bosnia; thus increasing the resource of consistent political values. 
Its success also attracts attention to Turkey’s business culture.  
 
Turkey’s biggest media company in terms of the number of television and radio 
channels owned, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), is also 
present and very active in Bosnia. TRT has an agency in Sarajevo that watches 
daily news in the country. Thus, it provides daily communication. TRT 
cooperates with another state owned media company, Anadolu Agency, as 
well as local companies. In one of its channels, TRT Avaz, TRT broadcasts in 
Bosnian language to the Turkish public. It also has a website in the Bosnian 
language that conveys news from Turkey.  
 
TRT operates on the daily communication dimension. Its daily broadcast of the 
developments in Turkey raises awareness about Turkey’s domestic and 
international policies in Bosnia. After minor or major events, TRT enables the 
Turkish government to convey its own analysis to Bosnians, bringing its own 
perspective against possible opposing or misinforming news agencies. It 
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enhances the legitimate and moral foreign policy resource by creating the 
change to continuously explain the reason behind government policies. 
 
The Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo, Turkey’s official diplomatic mission, along 
with implementing direct political decisions, as expected, also contributes to 
the soft power offensive. It coordinates state missions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and organizes its own efforts to introduce Turkish culture. Its 
Culture and Promotion Consultancy organizes an annual Turkish Film Festival. 
Having completed the fifth event, the embassy brings Turkish celebrities to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ministry of Culture, n.d.). 
 
Surely, the Turkish Embassy as the diplomatic representative of Turkish 
government, operates on all dimensions and enhances all resources. However, 
its primary dimension needs to be strategic communication. It explains 
Turkey’s position and possible upcoming decision to specifically targeted 
Bosnian institutions. This communication results in clarifying Turkey’s position 
and understanding the position of the Bosnian government in particular 
events.   
 
4.2. Civic Missions  
Although state-to-public missions have larger funds and are better organized, 
society-to-society missions are able to reach distant communities in Bosnia. 
One of those missions, established by Foundation for the Development of 
Education in Sarajevo (SEDEF) in 2003, the International University of 
Sarajevo, where I obtained my bachelor's degree, is the biggest private 
university in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It employs 200 local and international 
academic and administrative professionals. Currently, it has around two 
thousand students, most of whom are from Bosnia and Herzegovina (IUS, 
n.d.). The university’s board of trustees has ten members, and seven of these 
members are Turkish, along with the current and all previous rectors. IUS has 
21 study programs under five faculties. Although its official language of 
education is English, students that enroll in any of the programs are offered 
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courses on Turkish history, literature and language. Its most significant 
contribution to the soft power strategy is the university’s function as the 
meeting ground for Turkish and Bosnian citizens. Turkish students in the 
university study alongside with their Bosnian peers. Academics from both 
countries carry out joint courses and seminars on Turkish and Bosnian history 
and politics. Every development in Turkey is conveyed instantly to the Bosnian 
members of the university personally, whether by organized meetings or by 
casual coffee talks. Namely, the university acts as the melting pot for Turks 
and Bosnians. 
 
Moreover, during the years I studied in IUS, I observed that many Turkish and 
Bosnian citizens joined their lives. Most of these couples have settled in Bosnia. 
Mixed marriages naturally result in “experts of culture” that are able to find 
detailed similarities between the two cultures and convey them to rest of the 
public. I follow this through my personal contacts. Some of my friends that 
only had superficial knowledge of Bosnia and Bosnian culture now tell me the 
most special stories of Bosnian elders after a few years following their marriage 
with Bosnians. I think this is a significant example for understanding the 
difference between PtS and StS missions. With its more personalized structure, 
society-to-society missions enable establishing very strong ties in the long 
term.  
 
Founded by a prominent Turkish businessman of Bosnian origin in 2010, the 
Center for Developing Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BİGMEV) is a 
prominent civil mission. Operating particularly at the level of economic 
relations, BİGMEV mediates between ministries, business chambers and 
companies of the two countries. BİGMEV has a sizable match-making center 
that is accredited by the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology. Enabled 
by this accreditation, the center grants up to 60% state assistance to Turkish 
businesses investing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, BİGMEV 
continuously organizes business trips to different locations in Bosnia, taking 
interested Turkish businessmen on-site to introduce investment opportunities. 
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The foundation has signed cooperation agreements in Bosnia with 20 state 
institutions, 28 municipalities, 20 NGOs, and 5 business chambers (BİGMEV, 
n.d.). 
 
In addition to its business activities, BİGMEV works to integrate the Bosnian 
diaspora. It claims that the number of Bosnians in diaspora is bigger than the 
number of Bosnians living in Bosnia and Herzegovina; therefore, if well 
organized, the diaspora would be a significant assistance in solving Bosnia’s 
ongoing problems by internationalizing their home country. BİGMEV has built 
a Bosnian diaspora database and educates Bosnians on diaspora strategies 
(BİGMEV, n.d.). 
 
The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce is another mission that works to enhance 
trade between Bosnia and Turkey. It annually organizes a Turkish Products 
Exhibition in Sarajevo.  In 2015, 45 Turkish companies participated and more 
than 8 thousand local businessmen visited the exhibition (Ministry of Economy, 
2015). 
 
The Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) is another noteworthy organization 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IHH works on various fields ranging from seek and 
rescue missions to consciousness-raising and education. However, its main aid 
area in Bosnia is the orphans.  In 2012, 77 orphans were in the sponsorship 
program (IHH, 2012).In only a couple of years, IHH increased this number 
more than 16 times. As of 2015, IHH sponsors 1253 orphans with their health, 
food, clothing, education and social needs on regular basis.  Moreover, the 
foundation organizes outdoor activities as picnics and trips to help orphans 
socialize with their peers (IHH, 2015). These orphans along with the homeless 
and poor also benefit from Eid-al Adha donations. 
 
In addition to its humanitarian relief activities, IHH also supports cultural 
communication efforts. In Sarajevo’s Bascarsija district, it has financed the 
opening of the Istanbul Education and Culture Center that offers courses on 
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Turkish and Bosnian languages and traditional arts as well as vocational 
courses. The center also helps the coordination of IHH operations in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (IHH, n.d.). 
 
All public-to-public missions operate on building lasting relations. Occasionally, 
they may expand to other dimensions as well. These institutions are not pre-
planned by a central authority and their efforts are not coordinated. Thus, their 
place in Turkey’s soft power offensive is partially ambiguous.  
 
4.3. State Missions versus Civic Missions 
Professionals that work within the framework of a certain state institution are 
limited in their method and techniques of communication, as well as by the 
context of the work they participate in. Moreover, these professionals may be 
located in some other states by the central management and their ties are 
either lost or weakened in the target country. Volunteers, on the other hand, 
may maintain their contact without restrictions on multiple directions. Their 
ties may extend to family relations and business partnerships, making it much 
more special than official communications.  
 
Moreover, civic missions directly focus on citizens without intermediary 
institutions, whereas state missions often work with home state that may 
influence the distribution of aids or aims of projects due to political reasons. 
In the former, activities are dependent on the political conformity between the 
two states. However, in the latter civic mission operate without political 
concerns and do expect to benefit from their activities.  
 
4.4. Turkey versus Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Turkey’s overall soft power offensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina diverges from 
the Western offensive in one respect; that is, Turkey’s actual history in the 
country. When observed, Turkey’s tools and method are similar to Europe’s 
and America’s. The EU with its Pre-accession Assistance and the states with 
its USAID are bringing state funds to assist Bosnia. Their NGOs such as British 
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Youth Council of England; Association Culturelle Joseph Jacquemotte, AEGEE 
Europe, Bruegel of Belgium; Bridging Europe of Greece, Banlieues d’Europe, 
Fondation Sciences Citoyennes of France; Citizens of Europe, A Soul for Europe 
of Germany,Balkan Trust for Democracy, Youth Initiative for Democracy of the 
States and many more engage Bosnian public.  
 
Most of these organizations manifest their goal as assisting Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s “development” in different areas. Reference in the subjected 
development is the Western liberal norms, not only in culture but in trade, law, 
art and all remaining sectors. These values are relatively global but it would 
be very hard to say that they have strong roots in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
That is due to the Ottoman and Yugoslavian experiences of this country. 
Culture in both Ottoman and Yugoslavian eras was distant from the Western 
liberal worldview. I should highlight, one more time, it is not only the individual 
lifestyle we should study here, but culture of the nation in every field. 
 
On the other hand, Turkey bases its arguments on actual history with its 
achievements and failures. Its discourse is not based on what may be achieved 
through cooperation but what has happened. Despite the contradicting 
narratives, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the heart of the region for many 
centuries during the Ottoman era. Surely, this can only be an inspiration in 
beginning of a partnership that is fundamentally different in its form and 
instruments between Turkey and Bosnia. 
 
4.5. Responses to Turkey’s activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Turkish missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina returns positive response from 
different segments of Bosnian government and people. I would like to present 
some of the numerous examples on mainstream and social media. In an 
interview with successful students of Yunus Emre Institute’s Turkish Language 
Program in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hamida Catic, one of 80 students that 
were rewarded a week-long trip to Istanbul due to her accomplishments said 
that “We are brothers and sisters with Turkish people, we love them very 
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much” (Radiosarajevo, 2016).Yunus Emre Institute periodically sends 
successful Bosnian students for short-term visits to different cities in Turkey 
to provide them with a chance to practice their Turkish with native speakers 
as well as to enhance the students’ bond with Turkey.  
 
There are also Bosnians that receive Turkey’s support to live and study in 
Turkey. Alexandra Immamovic one of nearly 300 Bosnian students that study 
in Turkey with YTB scholarships said in an interview to Bosnians that seek 
chance to study in Turkey that “Terms of study are quite satisfactory [here]. 
The scholarship covers all costs of the home in which we live to the monthly 
allowance. I recommend that you come [to study in Turkey] through the state 
agency YTB” (Klix, 2015). Students that come to Turkey with YTB scholarships 
are not only registered to universities in Turkey’s major cities like Istanbul and 
Ankara but to various universities in Anatolia. Aleksandra, for example,has 
been studying in Ataturk University, in the city of Erzurum. 
 
Responses from top management of Bosnia’s Islamic community that closely 
follows Turkey’s daily politics are some other examples. The community does 
not hesitate to publicly express its relation with Turkey. For instance, The 
Grand Mufti Husein ef. Kavazovićwas one of the first to express support for 
Turkey after the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. A day after the attempt, 
in an interview, he stated that: “Last night was a night of great challenges and 
horrors. [I Pray] with anxiety at heart and sincere prayers addressed to the 
Supreme Lord to help our brothers” (“Na podmukao,” 2016). 
 
On another instance Dženita Jusufbegović General Director of Bosnia’s state 
television BHRT publicly expressed BHRT’s appreciation to Turkey for TRT’s 
donation of technical equipment and partnership (TRT, 2013).TRT and BHRT 
often work in joint projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
As I have stated earlier, Turkey’s IHH provides Eid-al Adha donations.During 
the distribution of beef as a part of these activities in Bosnia, a resident of 
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Bosnian City of Tuzla said in an interview with the local news agency that 
“These [activities] are very important things, they show us that these people 
are not forgotten and abandoned, especially at this time of the holiday season” 
(Tuzlanski, 2016). 
 
Following another humanitarian aid activity, activities of Turkish Red Crescent 
and AFAD for the victims of floods in the city of Maglaj, Bosnian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Zlatko Lagumdžija thanked Turkish government and nation for 
their support in a meeting with Turkey’s ambassador to BiH (MVP, 2014). 
Turkish missions were a few of the humanitarian relief organizations that 
arrived to Maglaj. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OBSTACLES TO TURKEY’S SOFT POWER 
 
As said before, Turkey is pursuing a wide and systematic soft power strategy 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there are a few but very complex 
problems to solve before Turkey can ensure victory for its strategy. In this 
chapter, I will try to explain these problems that require a great deal of 
attention from Turkish policy-makers. 
  
5.1. Historical Hostilities 
Ottoman rule in Bosnia resulted in a Slavic Muslim nation that had superiority 
over non-Muslim Bosnians for more than four centuries. Now only remembered 
in the very old stories of older generations, these years were the era of peace 
and prosperity for the Bosniaks whose grandsons today support Turkish 
involvement in their domestic politics. However, the same era is considered as 
“a time of enslavement and tragedy” for the remaining ethnic groups (Vracic, 
2014). Such Ottoman policies as the child-levy, cizye tax and the oppressive 
rule of unregulated provincial elites like janissary commanders and ayans are 
remembered as Ottoman oppression by the non-Muslims. It seems that the 
scope and iteration of such tragedies were exaggerated through “a distorted 
interpretation of history” by the Balkan romantic nationalists (Turbedar, 2011). 
Thus, upcoming generations in Bosnia were taught an Ottoman history that is 
built only on the mistakes of the Ottomans, disregarding Istanbul’s efforts to 
punish the oppressors by outlawing ayans and janissaries. In fact, even recent 
history textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina give students the overall 
impression that Ottomans were the “common historical enemy” (Muhasilovic, 
2014). 
 
Deeply rooted in the non-Muslim communities’ collective memory, this 
“trauma” evokes suspicion and anxiety for some Bosnians when they witness 
a Turkish company opening a new store or a Turkish state institution donating 
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thousands of blankets. This perception is being transferred to upcoming 
generations. In a recent research on Bosnian Serb Students, subjects were 
asked the first thing that comes to their mind after hearing “Ottoman Empire”. 
49% of the students answered “Occupier” and 40% of the students answered 
“Enemy” that indicates almost half of future Bosnian Serb community keeps 
historical hatred against Turkey’s preceding state (Muhasilovic, 2014). 
 
Turkey may never fully obtain Bosnia’s appreciation for its efforts, considering 
the fact that some of the Bosnians still see Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic 
as a hero (Wilkinson & Sterling, 2012) who stated to TV camera before 
ordering the slaughter of 8.000 Bosnian Muslims that "On this day I give 
Srebrenica to the Serb people, the time has finally come for revenge against 
Turks [Bosnian Muslims] who live in this area" (Hodzic, 2012). 
 
5.2. Structural Complications 
Another obstacle that also partially fortifies Bosnian Serb resistance to 
appreciation of Turkey in the country is the fragmented nature of the Bosnian 
state structure. Perception of Turkey is substantially negative in Republika 
Srpska (Turbedar, 2011). Differently from having individual oppositions to 
Turkish presence, Republika Srpska has its own central government that may 
through organized institutions block Turkey’s influence.  
 
As I said before, Turkish activism in the region is strongly affiliated with Turkish 
President Erdogan’s personal sympathy for the country. Unless structured as 
a systematic strategy, not just as a romantic involvement, Turkish efforts may 
be hampered if Turkey’s president retires. Soft power mainly bears fruits over 
the long term; so the future of the strategy must be well planned.  
 
Turkey’s discourse in Bosnia, as announced officially, comprises a history and 
culture that may be very influential on some Bosnians. But as Nye (2008) 
explains, in order for culture to be effective in soft power politics, it should be 
contextually attractive. Turkish culture and history, as I mentioned earlier, are 
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not attractive to all Bosnians. Turkey must enlarge its soft power discourse by 
introducing additional arguments. Turkey’s secular democratic experience may 
be uttered more often, increasing its portion in the soft power discourse, due 
to the simple fact that Muslims are slightly a majority in Bosnia.  
 
5.3. Hard Power Limitations  
Lastly, Turkey should realize that “there is no soft power without hard power” 
(Cooper, 2004). A state may design very sophisticated strategies to influence 
other states. However, without manifesting hard power, it will be very difficult 
to influence others. Regardless of geography and context, manifesting hard 
power, in other words, manifesting military or economic strength inoculates 
others with confidence and fear, both enhancing generated rate of soft power.  
 
It would not be correct to say Turkish politicians are completely ignoring this 
argument. Erdoğan’s invitation of foreign leaders to opening ceremonies of 
giant projects such as Marmaray sub-sea tunnel, Yavuz Selim Bridge, Osman 
Gazi Bridge and many more is a contributing policy. He shows them what the 
Turkish economy is able to afford. Bakir Izzetbegovic is a frequent guest in 
these ceremonies. He publicly shares his positive observations in Bosnia, 
arousing curiosity towards Turkey among Bosnians. 
 
Demonstrating military strength, is perhaps more important than 
demonstrating financial strength. Turkey’s recent operation in Syria is a 
favorable move in this respect. Although this operation is not in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s region, it shows what Turkey is eventually capable of 
performing. As Turkey’s hard power becomes more obliging, its soft power will 
become more persuasive. 
 
However, I would like to convey another argument that diverts Turkey’s use 
of soft power from other great powers in its target regions. Turkey, unlike US, 
Russia and the EU, has limited hard power. By hard power, I refer to coercing 
and inducing. The United States, for instance, leans heavily on its military and 
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economic resources to adjust other states’ decision in accordance with its 
interest. In the last two decades, US army invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. It 
intervened in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan and Haiti. The US 
government imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Myanmar 
and individuals from numerous different states. Meanwhile, US has continued 
its soft power politics, only as a supplementary strategy.  
 
Russia recently intervened in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Despite all objections 
from the EU and the US, it annexed Crimea. It imposed sanctions on the 
European Union and temporarily on Turkey. Moreover, Russia continuously 
intimidates North European and Scandinavian states by violating their 
airspace. Although Russia’s aggressive policies damage its overall soft power, 
it attracts certain ethnic groups amongst its Slavic neighbors. Pro-Russian 
insurgency of 2014 in Ukraine is a good example of Russia’s soft power. 
 
The European Union does not have its united army but intervened in 
Yugoslavia, Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Somalia and Mali for peace 
keeping purposes. Its hardest power is its economic wealth, and the EU does 
not hesitate to use it. Currently, it imposes sanctions on various African states, 
Iran and Russia.  
 
Turkey, on the other hand, does participate in peace keeping operations and 
confirms with UN-led mandatory sanctions on other states.However, it is not 
as comfortable as its potential opponents in using hard power due to its 
relatively fragile economy and limited military capability. Traditionally, Turkish 
army is a strong defensive power; however its strength as an offensive military 
is disputable.  
 
Although it caused a great deal of security gap, Turkey’s reluctance to 
intervene in its neighbor Syria for five years is a good example of Turkey’s 
distrust of its military’s offensive power. The most significant reason for that, 
is lack of Turkish mechanized and aerial defense industry.  
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Surely, exploring Turkey’s hard power would require a separate, deeper 
analysis. But I observe that Turkey is compelled to use soft power as a 
substitute to hard power, not as supplementary to it.   
 
5.4. Neo-Ottomanist Indictment 
Turkey’s overall activism in the Balkans and the Middle East has raised the 
question whether Turkey aims to “revitalize” the Ottoman Empire. Drawing 
intensive attention with the attractive term, neo-Ottomanism, and the debate 
has occupied scholars for quite some time. In this section I will try to elaborate 
neo-Ottomanism and its varied perceptions. Moreover, I will appraise this 
chapter as a chance to convey my analysis on what Turkey plans to use its 
soft power for. 
 
Turkey has been an active actor in the Balkans since the end of the cold war. 
Contrary to what is popularly voiced, Turkey’s close relations with the Balkan 
states began by the late 80s, almost two decades before the AKP government. 
It reached its peak during the crisis in Yugoslavia. Former President Turgut 
Özal (89-93) literally dedicated Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin to the 
defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav crisis.  
 
Although Turkey failed to stop the tragedy in Yugoslavia, it partially succeeded 
in drawing the attention of the international community to the tragedy in 
Bosnia, as discussed in the previous chapter. Turkey’s interest in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as overall in the Balkans, did not diminish when Suleyman 
Demirel succeeded Turgut Özal as president. During President Demirel’s term 
in office (1993-2000), Turkey granted great amount of funds, 46.5 million 
dollars, to the reconstruction of Bosnia (US General Accounting Office, 1997). 
Even when Turkey faced one of the biggest economic crisis in its history in 
2001, it continued its presence in the region through intergovernmental 
organizations. After AKP’s election into office, the relation between the two 
countries took a multidimensional structure. I tried to explain details of Turkish 
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activity in Bosnia. I would like to continue with the debate about the aims of 
Turkey’s active foreign policy. 
 
5.4.1. Criticism of Turkey’s Foreign Policy Shift 
By the mid-2000 Turkey visibly changed its approach to the Caucasus and 
Eurasia, the Middle-East and South East Europe (Somun, 2011). Scholars have 
different opinions on why Turkey shifted its foreign policy. Two main 
arguments gained recognition. First, Turkey with an awfully romantic 
approach, aims to revive the Ottoman Empire, or sort of an Ottoman 
Federation, on the former Ottoman lands by using an Islamic discourse and its 
former Islamic leadership experience (Vracic, 2014). The core of the argument 
here is Turkey’s desire to recapture global, or, at least, regional, leadership of 
Muslims by expanding its cultural influence. Second, Turkey with a realistic 
approach, aims to enlarge its influence for pragmatic reasons on the former 
Ottoman lands by using a liberal discourse (Taspinar, 2008). The main 
argument here is that Turkish foreign policy was influenced by the liberal 
international politics and economy, and it focuses on the former Ottoman 
states to make allies.  
 
One of the reasons for arguing about Turkish romance towards the former 
Ottoman states is surely the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s passionate speeches about Turkey’s neighboring 
regions. For instance, in 2009, while telling how Turkey successfully mediated 
the conflict between Israel and Hamas in a party meeting, Davutoğlu said: 
This is the reason why the European Union does not wish to see us [in 
the Union]. Because we solve the problems in this region. We have 
inherited the Ottoman legacy. They call us neo-Ottomans. Yes, we are 
the neo-Ottomans. We have to deal with the troubles of our region 
(Directorate General of Press and Information, n.d. para.3). 
 
At first glance, drawing on the Ottoman Empire that for centuries dealt with 
the troubles of the regions it ruled, is confounding. But it provides legitimacy 
and motivation for Turkey’s active stance in the area.  Davutoglu’s self-
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assigned tasks regarding the former Ottoman states are also visible in his book 
“Strategic Depth”. For instance, regarding the Balkans, he says: 
Particularly, efforts of the two main Ottoman remainders in the Balkans, 
Bosniaks and Albanians, to survive as independent entities require the 
promotion of shared historical and cultural ties between these natural 
allies and Turkey (Davutoglu, 2001, p.89). 
 
These statements, if dissociated from their context, may direct us to think that 
Turkey is romantic with the Balkans and it moves with a sort of religious 
idealism to revive pax-Ottomanica (Arin, 2015). However, from another angle, 
these and other statements could also be perceived as attempts to find a 
connection point with the target states on which a realist/pragmatic 
relationship can be built. This sort of legitimization approach is not new; it is 
actually applied numerous times by Western states. For instance, former US 
President George Bush said in a speech prior to the invasion of Iraq in 
American Enterprise Institute:  
A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital 
region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. 
America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead 
in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq (“Full text”, 2003, 
para.8). 
 
Or in another example, Russian President Putin answered a question regarding 
the situation in Crimea: 
... if I do decide to use the Armed Forces, this will be a legitimate 
decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, 
since we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our 
commitments, which in this case coincide with our interests to protect 
the people with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic 
ties (Presidential Executive Office, 2014, para.39). 
 
In both examples the leaders refer to certain values for the possible policies 
that we now clearly know are motivated by pragmatic reasons. Bush 
emphasizes liberty and Putin emphasizes shared history and values. However, 
the real reason behind the invasions that came shortly after these statements, 
was to enhance national security and economy of the US and Russia. The truth 
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is that, seeking legitimacy with idealist rhetoric does not mean producing policy 
based on idealist motives. 
 
5.4.2. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Justification 
Turkey’s new foreign policy is a mixture of real-politik and ideal-politik that is 
weaved around political and economic justice, principles of security and 
freedom, and trade and economic development (Kalın, 2011). 
 
Principle of justice refers to the uneven distribution of resources and rights to 
the Balkans, the Middle-East, Africa, and other poor nations. Turkey defends 
development of nations in these regions. Restricted or limited representation 
of states in intergovernmental organization and exclusive rights granted to 
certain states as in the case of permanent members of UN Security Council are 
also voiced by Turkey to be detrimental to establishing global justice. As 
President Erdoğan said in his speech to the UN General Assembly, “… I should 
underline that world is bigger than the five” (“Erdoğan”, 2014, para1).If we 
turn to our focus country, as stated earlier, Turkey is the strongest supporter 
of Bosnia’s membership to NATO, hoping to increase international 
representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Security and freedom refers to domestic and global security in a balance. The 
balance should be well designed because “…security without freedom leads to 
authoritarianism and freedom without security invites chaos and instability” 
(Kalın, 2012, p.15) This principle is highly observable in Turkey’s domestic 
politics: while it grants equal rights to Kurdish minority, Turkish military 
simultaneously severely attacks insurgent Kurdish terrorist organization. In 
Bosnia, Turkey supports the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities. However, it sides with underprivileged Bosniaks. While Bosnian-
Croats and Bosnian-Serbs have Croatia and Serbia as their mother states 
supporting them, Bosniaks mostly rely on Turkey. 
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Lastly, trade and investment principle refers to Turkey’s stronger integration 
to international economy, enhancing its trade volume with its neighbors and 
beyond. Attempts to lift visas, create free-trade zones and government 
incentives are indicators of this principle. Erdoğan’s displeasure with the 
current Turkish investment volume in Bosnia and Herzegovina is one example. 
Turkey projects that larger trade relations bring tighter political relations (Kalın 
2011). 
 
As it is observed from the principles, Turkey’s new activism does not seek to 
revive the Ottoman golden age. On the contrary, it plans for practicable foreign 
policy goals. 
 
5.4.3. Origins of Neo-Ottomanism 
Moreover, actual Ottomanism in the late years of the Ottoman Empire was not 
implemented by idealist motives either. By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman 
Empire was severely threatened by nationalist movements. It clearly observed 
that two essential policies had to be replaced. First, non-Muslims could no 
longer have secondary status. Second, official Islamic discourse had to be 
softened. These precautions were taken in 1869, when all people living within 
Ottoman borders were declared equal subjects, members of the Ottoman 
Nation (Hashemi, 2014). Nevertheless, dissolution of the empire continued 
with popular revolts in the Balkans. This policy shift was a pragmatic turn. The 
Ottomans who proudly declared themselves as the protector of Muslims and 
the Caliphate, protector of all Muslims, abandoned the former image of the 
empire in the hope of gaining its non-Muslim citizens’ support.  
 
For pragmatic reasons, following the failed Ottoman Nation project, Sultan 
Abdulhamit returned to Islamic policies (Hashemi, 2014). Predicting what 
future may hold for the empire, the Sultan hoped to ignite an Islamic revival 
that would support Islam’s pioneer front against the West. This attempt failed 
as well and left its place to Westernism, accelerating after the establishment 
of modern Turkey. 
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5.4.4. Counter Arguments 
Having provided different perspectives on the debate, I believe, Turkey’s 
traditional West-oriented foreign policy that avoided close relations with 
Muslim states, particularly in the Middle East, gave place to a more liberal 
doctrine after 2002.  The new foreign policy under AKP government removed 
Turkey’s self-imposed barriers. For the Turkish government, Islam and Islamic 
communication were the major vehicles for increasing the Turkish influence. 
This potential was idle in the traditional approach to foreign policy. Attempts 
to reutilize Islamic experience as a tool also enlarged Turkey’s influence of 
domain. Muslim states, due to their centuries-long relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire, gained pragmatic importance in Turkey’s security and 
economy agenda. The territories under Ottoman sovereignty, particularly the 
Balkans, were good starting points for its new strategy (McDonald, 2012). 
 
Turkey that pursued a defensive realist strategy through manifestation of its 
coercive power during most of the pre-AKP governments changed its route to 
become a partner state through manifestation of its soft power (Rüma, 2011). 
Its emphasis on soft power aims to pave the way for the development of 
partnerships that will benefit Turkey’s security and economy, and not to 
animate Ottomanism. In fact “Neo-Ottomanism does not call for Turkish 
imperialism in the Middle-East and the Balkans” (Taspinar, 2008, p.14). 
 
On the other hand, attempts to revive relations with former Ottoman states 
do not come only from the government. As I said in the previous chapter, civic 
actors voluntarily play a very significance role in Turkey’s overall soft power 
strategy.  I would like to underline an important detail that is not orchestrated 
by the AKP government but simply enabled by its years-long presence in 
power. During the single party period, until 1945, every non-governmental 
organization had to operate within the narrow borders drawn by the central 
government; thus civil initiatives did not develop. NGOs and businesses that 
were led by religious and right wing political individuals lacked opportunities 
to establish international relations. Following the transition to multiparty 
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democracy, civil society as well as the private sector began growing (Özkiraz 
& Arslanel, 2015). 
 
However this time, military coups of ‘60, ‘80 and ‘97 redesigned civil initiatives 
in accordance with the national radical secularist ideology by closing NGOs, 
political parties and seizing private companies, hampering the empowerment 
of religious-conservative segments of society. During the AKP government, 
extensive democratization and privatization in accordance with the EU criteria 
and resistance to military involvement in politics resulted with the flowering of 
these civil initiatives. 
 
Turning to neo-Ottomanism debate, how Turkey’s activism affects non-
Muslim and anti-Turkish groups is another dimension that is very seldom 
argued. I believe, there is more to explore about their opposition to Turkish 
involvement than security concerns. Historically, taunting Turks as the other, 
non-European, was not only an outcome of the perceived cultural differences 
but a tool for newly emerging states’ nation-building processes (McDonald, 
2012). People in the Balkan States and the Middle-East also had their 
differences between themselves depending on their hometowns, religiosity, 
sect, accent, and overall culture.  
 
Their history under Ottoman rule was one of the strongest values which 
different segments in these countries shared, and it is still reminded by leaders 
of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina such as Milorad Dodik of Republika 
Srpska and Veso Vegar of HDZ 1990.  
 
The significance of the common Ottoman heritage is better understood when 
considering that most of these ethnic groups did not have self-governance 
experience for more than five centuries. The collective “cause” against the 
Ottoman Empire filled this void, gathering people under newly emerging 
centralized states. Today, “the Turkish threat” is a useful tool for internal unity 
of different ethnic segments. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as I have supported 
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with examples, this is apparent amongst Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat 
politicians.  
  
5.4.5. Europe’s Role in Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Rationale 
Finally, Europe’s role in Turkey’s decision to change its route should not be 
overlooked. For decades, Turkey not only self-westernized, but also appealed 
for official “recognition” by European states. After half a century-long struggle 
to become a member, the EU still keeps Turkey in the waiting room. 
Disappointed by its externalization, Turkey’s enthusiastic efforts to make new 
friends or revive old relations should not be surprising. President Erdogan’s 
statements to France 24 News in a recent interview clearly gives clues about 
this Turkey’s disappointment. The President said that “The EU has been 
keeping us at its door for 53 years. Were the countries they have received as 
a member better than Turkey in terms of the EU acquis?” (Presidency, 2016, 
para.5). 
 
Turkey’s determined activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is partially related to 
the European Union as well. Due to the Peace Agreement, there is an Office 
of High Representative (OHR) that is responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the agreement and fulfill the requirements of the 
Implementation Council. The office enjoys extraordinary authority over the 
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact OHR’s responsibility is to 
ensure that the government institutions function properly (OHR, n.d.). In order 
to meet this vaguely defined responsibility, OHR’s powers include “the 
imposition of substantial legislation, the amendment of Bosnian legislation, the 
dismissal of elected government officials, and the annulment of decisions of 
the Bosnian Constitutional Court” (Banning, 2014, p.261).  Due to Dayton 
Peace Agreement, Annex 10, Article 1.2, The High Representative is appointed 
by the United Nations Security Council.  
 
OHR is responsible only to the Peace Implementation Council. The council has 
a steering board that acts as its managerial branch. In the board, Canada, 
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France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States are 
individually represented, while Turkey represents the Organization of Islamic 
Conference.  
 
In substance, Bosnia and Herzegovina is governed by the Western powers 
whose decisions cannot be directly influenced by Turkey. In order to maintain 
influence, Turkey has to be active in Bosnia through soft power tools, if it does 
not wish to be excluded from the entire design of this country. This behavior 
does not refer to neo-Ottomanism or sort of imperialist policy, but it simply is 
an effort to obtain power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Power” is one of the most debated issues in the social sciences. The ways an 
actor successfully changes another actor’s behavior have been studied by 
many scholars. Thus far, three main paradigms, in other words, the three faces 
of power, have been asserted in the political sciences domain. The first 
defends that power is to hold the right or capability to make decisions. The 
second argues that power is the right or capability to prevent issues from 
reaching the decision-making process. And the third also claims that power is 
the capability to change decision-makers’ values and interests.  
 
Influenced by these studies before him, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of 
soft power. According to Nye, actors are able to practice power over others to 
make them comply with their choices in three ways: Coercion which refers to 
forcing others to comply; inducement which refers to paying others to comply; 
attraction which refers to co-opt others into complying. An actor’s capability 
into co-opt others to complying with its own interest is called soft power. 
 
The capacity of an actor’s soft power depends on three resources: contextually 
attractive culture, sincere and consistent political values, and foreign policy 
that is moral and legitimate. These resources are used and reproduced through 
the three dimensions of daily communication, strategic communication and 
building lasting relations.  
 
Turkey is a keen practitioner of soft power. Its synthesis of Ottoman history 
and culture with Turkish democratic experience is the foundation of its soft 
power strategy. It has been reinterpreting its history by shifting its efforts from 
westernization to reconciliation with tradition to find a common ground with 
the former Ottoman provinces. 
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Turkey’s changing geostrategic position, domestic shift in its mind-set and 
globally changing foreign policy instrument caused a fundamental change in 
its foreign policy. As manifested, this foreign policy centers on the principles 
of political and economic justice, security and freedom and trade and economic 
development. 
 
Bosnia, as one of these provinces, is a distinct example of Turkey’s strategy of 
soft power. Supporting it before and during the Yugoslav war, following the 
peace agreement, the Turkish government launched numerous missions to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that work in various fields, on different dimensions, 
using and enhancing soft power resources. The success of the Turkish soft 
power strategy is visible in Bosnia’s favorable response to Turkish demands as 
well as Bosnian interest in Turkey’s domestic issues.  
 
Being also a sphere of influence for Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina is also 
significant for observing the cultural struggle between Turkey and the West. 
Turkey asserts its history, culture and religion while Europe asserts Western 
liberal values, Schengen and stability. The latter is appealing not only to non-
Muslim but also to secular Muslim Bosnians while the former steadily seeks to 
consolidate its position. 
 
Turkey’s activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other former Ottoman 
states, triggered the debate whether Turkey is turning to its Ottoman roots. 
Gained popularity with the term “neo-Ottomanism”, many scholars attended 
the debate. My analysis is that Turkey changed its traditional defensive foreign 
policy due to the liberal transformation of its domestic politics and the 
international politics after the end of the Cold War. Turkey aims to extend its 
relations with the former Ottoman states, not to revive the Ottoman Empire, 
but because it has more leverage on these states than others. It is simply 
easier for Turkey to find a common ground to build relations with the Balkan 
States and the Middle-Eastern states than, say, South American states.  
 
67 
 
It should be noted that Turkey lacks extensive hard power to directly intervene 
in these states. Its military and economy are efficient for defense but not for 
intervention. Thus, Turkey is compelled to substitute its hard power 
inefficiency with soft power. In other words, Turkey chooses the time-
consuming but safe strategy based on soft power instead of quick but risky 
strategy based on hard power.  
 
In the future, Turkey should continue its efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with a smoothened Islamic discourse. Its democratic experience is an 
important resource that should be highlighted more often. Islam is exclusively 
attractive to Muslims; but democracy is universal and targets a bigger domain. 
Moreover, emphasis on not only researching the Ottoman history in Bosnia, 
but also using a persuasive secular narrative may weaken non-Muslim 
resistance. In any case, Turkey is following a promising strategy. Yet there is 
still much to do to have substantial capability to influence Bosnia’s agenda. 
 
Turkey’s increased activism in its foreign affairs caught attention of many 
scholar. Thus, there are a number of works on Turkey’s soft power strategy. 
Although the Balkans consist a significant portion of the studies, most of the 
work on this issue take the Middle-Eastern states as their cases.  
 
The volume of publications on Turkish activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
very limited. It is possible to learn certain activities of state missions from their 
official reports. But there are not any descriptive works on the activities of 
Turkey’s civic missions. Moreover, it is very hard to find scholarly publication 
on Bosnia’s reactions to Turkish missions. Such information may be acquired 
from the media and political speeches.  
 
This theses provides an overall view of Turkey’s new foreign policy rationale. 
And a short examination of Turkish applications in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This work may be an introduction to detailed studies of Turkish-Bosnian 
relations, Turkish foreign policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and transformation 
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in Turkey’s foreign policy and Turkish-European relations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
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